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Preface 
The initiative for the present study was taken at a GTZ conference in May 2004 on "Co-
operation with the Diaspora". The contributions made at this conference were a clear reflec-
tion of the great importance which the diverse economic and social activities of Diaspora 
communities have on the development of their countries of origin and, moreover, on building 
bridges between different societies. Hence, one important recommendation of the confer-
ence was to further enhance this positive impact and make use of it in a more targeted man-
ner so as to formulate and implement joint projects within the framework of international co-
operation.   
Against this background, GTZ had commissioned a comprehensive study in 2005 on ex-
ploring and evaluating the activities of three selected Diaspora communities – the Egyptian, 
the Afghan and the Serbian Diaspora. The Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural 
Studies (IMIS) of the University of Osnabrück and the Migration Research Group (MRG) of 
the Hamburgische Welt-Wirtschafts-Archiv (HWWA) and the Hamburg Institute of Interna-
tional Economics (HWWI) were enlisted to carry out the research. Starting point of the inves-
tigations was to examine the respective different migration movements and existing forms of 
organisation of the Diaspora in Germany. The key issue was to investigate the development 
contributions which the respective communities have been making to date, and what can be 
done to link these useful activities to official development cooperation, thereby better ex-
hausting the potential of Diaspora communities.  
The results of the study now available contain three major key messages for GTZ and, in 
turn, serve as starting points for concrete joint projects to be implemented together with the 
Diaspora within the scope of the new sector project "Migration and Development": 
1. With their comprehensive interview material and on a well-founded scientific basis, the 
authors of the study produce evidence of the actually existing potential of the Diaspora, 
knowledge of which so far had been somewhat vague and based on isolated information 
only.  
2. Good integration of the migrants in their host country has a positive impact also on their 
activities in the country of origin. Integration and transnational activities therefore are not 
– as it is sometimes stated - contradictory; and  
3. Diaspora activities and development cooperation concepts show a great deal of similari-
ties and thus offer a good foundation for future joint projects.  
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In recent academic and political discussions, the contribution of Diaspora communities to 
development in their countries of origin has been recognised. There is, however, a consider-
able need for knowledge about (a) the types and patterns of economic, social and cultural 
transfer between the Diaspora and the countries of origin, (b) the social, economic and politi-
cal conditions for the establishment or the obstruction of such transfers, as well as (c) the 
requirements of policies that attempt to constructively support such efforts and exploit them 
for developmental policy objectives. Considering the example of the Afghan, Egyptian and 
Serbian Diaspora communities in Germany, the goal of this pilot study is to develop and test 
an explorative research heuristic that measures the dimensions relevant for investigating that 
contribution. This report primarily offers empirical, exemplary (not representative) insights 
into this issue. 
This study was carried out by the Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural Stud-
ies (IMIS) of the University of Osnabrück, together with the Migration Research Group (MRG) 
of the Hamburgische Welt-Wirtschafts-Archiv (HWWA) as well as the Hamburg Institute of 
International Economics (HWWI). It primarily relies on about 80 guiding interviews, con-
ducted in numerous cities in Germany with “key figures” of the three communities. Some of 
the interviews were also carried out in Belgrade, Serbia as well as Cairo, Egypt. (Given 
budgetary limitations and security concerns, no interviews were carried out in Afghanistan.) 
In addition, the study is based on the evaluation both of academic research and of diverse 
documents from national bodies and international organisations. 
Results of the Study 
The following conditions lay the foundation for our analysis: (a) the migrants themselves, 
i.e. their human capital, (b) the reason for their migration (labour, education, flight, fam-
ily/marriage), (c) the social conditions in the receiving countries and their social integration 
there, (d) the social conditions in the country of origin and the position of the migrants or their 
families there, as well as (e) the social forms of organisation of migrants in their receiving 
country (the structure of the Diaspora).   
The variables of this frame of reference occur in different combinations in the different Di-
aspora communities, as is shown in the communities we investigate in Germany: 
Egypt 
Migration from Egypt, which began in the 1950s, has primarily involved students from the 
upper-middle-class elite. A larger percentage of Egyptians are among the educated profes-
sional labour force; they have high quotas of naturalisation and of Germany-Egyptian mar-
riages, and they are well-integrated. Highly qualified migrants of Egyptian origin are usually 
organised in professional associations or Egyptian culture clubs. Like Rotary Clubs, these 
associations serve to reproduce, stabilise and strengthen their own elite networks. In com-
parison to the other two countries we have studied, Egypt has relatively stable political and 
economic conditions, combined with numerous possibilities for profitable investments. Many 
Egyptians take advantage of these opportunities; we thus find a number of profit-oriented 
investments, as well as individually initiated, profit-oriented activity beneficial to the common 
good. Much of this is in the prestigious areas of education and science.  
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Afghanistan 
The first Afghan migrants, in the 1950s, were predominantly students and businessmen, 
in particular, carpet dealers. With the beginning of the war in 1979 and in wake of the numer-
ous shifts in political power that followed, the refugees to Germany have been those with 
access to the resources necessary for the escape route. Initially, it was above all members of 
the western-oriented educated elite who sought asylum in Germany. However, after the mu-
jahideen assumed power, members of the communist party also came. The Taliban regime 
released another wave of refugees, this time largely of the urban middle class and rural eth-
nic and religious minorities. As a result of the different motivations and the social diffusion of 
the immigrants from Afghanistan, the Afghan Diaspora is very heterogeneous.   
Later waves of refugees were, and are, usually confronted with considerable difficulties 
integrating into Germany. These result from residence-status and labour-market restrictions, 
limiting the types of activities allowed them. However, second generation Afghan immigrants 
have increasingly become well-integrated into the German education system.   
Individual involvement in Afghanistan (e.g. through remittances to the country of origin 
and individual investments) and, above all, collective involvement (through numerous activi-
ties organised by associations) began with the outbreak of the war in 1979. These have in-
tensified to today. In the wake of the NATO development, after 2001 involvement became 
particularly strong. Through a war that has spanned over two decades, a major portion of the 
physical and social infrastructure has been destroyed. The new Afghan state is not (yet) able 
to provide the public goods necessary to normalise social life. Thus the involvement of the 
Diaspora in infrastructure projects in the areas of education, healthcare, science, girls’ and 
women’s advancement, humanitarian relief, transportation, and energy and water provision 
aims to compensate for the failings of the state. The increased involvement of the Diaspora 
in Afghanistan has undoubtedly been stimulated by the international attention (in particular 
directly after the NATO deployment). In this context, it has been possible to mobilise the fi-
nancial and political resources of national and international donors, as well as actors such as 
NGOs, and at times to create synergies with the projects of the Diaspora.  
Serbia 
The immigration of Serbians to Germany – initially from Yugoslavia – began in the 1960s 
with the guest worker agreements and followed on this basis until the recruitment stop in 
1973. The qualification structure of the migrants included both skilled and unskilled labour-
ers; however, a larger number of less qualified workers returned to Serbia (Yugoslavia) after 
the recruitment stop. This was then followed by the immigration of Serbians to Germany 
largely for purposes of family reunification. Besides the guest workers, a small but steady 
number of Serbian intellectuals had immigrated since as early as the 1950s; these were 
mostly opponents of the communist regime.   
 Yugoslavians and, later, Serbians organised in clubs (often culture or sport clubs), 
which were essentially directed towards the life of Serbian migrants in Germany. With the 
increase in ethnic conflicts in Yugoslavia and the eventual collapse of the country, there was 
a rise in the national consciousness of the Serbians living in Germany; and in the place of the 
earlier Yugoslavian clubs, Serbian clubs were founded.  
Already prior to the conflict in Yugoslavia, individual investments in Yugoslavia, especially 
in real estate, were the focus of the Serbian migrants’ activities there. In contrast to the Egyp-
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tians and the Afghans, they were not much involved in infrastructure development projects. 
This was different during the war that led to the dissolution of Yugoslavia and during the 
Kosovo conflict. At that time, similarly to the Afghans, if less comprehensively, the Serbian 
Diaspora was involved with its country of origin for patriotic reasons. In an attempt to com-
pensate for the state, which was tied up in the war, they thus were involved in diverse pro-
jects in the areas of healthcare, water provision, transportation and humanitarian relief.   
The difference from the Afghans’ involvement consists in the fact that this involvement 
aimed to support the weakened state. The state, however, was still able to win over the mi-
grants and mobilise their patriotism.  By contrast, the activities of the Afghans were influ-
enced by the much severer breakdown of the state of Afghanistan; as a result, their work is 
not even directed towards state activities. In contrast to that, the Serbians in Germany were 
publicly involved in trying to correct a view of the Serbian state in the international media, 
which they thought to be one-sided. There have only recently been renewed efforts, through 
the Serbian Ministry of Diaspora (founded in 2005), to reactivate the economic and political 
potential of the Serbian Diaspora. This indicates a stark contrast between the Serbians’ 
situation and that of the other migrant groups studied here: namely, the forms of organisa-
tion, as well as the political orientation and involvement of the Serbian migrants, are strongly 
determined by the political developments in their country of origin.    
Recommended Action 
The cases we have studied clearly show that in order to be able to recognise where de-
velopmental policy assistance might be applied, a precise case-by-case analysis is needed. 
This should be directed (a) at the points of conjuncture of the different frameworks at differ-
ent points of time, and (b) at their combined effect on the mobilisation of the Diaspora com-
munities. On the basis of this, action can be recommended in different areas: 
A) the promotion of economic activities, 
B) the promotion of activities related to the social infrastructure, 
C) the promotion of the political participation of the Diaspora, 
D) the promotion of the existing Diaspora structures,  
E) the development of legal and political conditions in the receiving country, as well as 
F) international collaboration.  
A) The promotion of economic activities 
• The promotion of the export extensions. This can occur by supporting the development 
of EU-compatible product standards, in particular in Egypt and Serbia.     
• Support in developing the energy sector. This offers the greatest prospects for the suc-
cess of a number of existing and planned infrastructure and economic activities in Af-
ghanistan.    
• The promotion of the agriculture sector in Afghanistan. Here co-operation is possible 
between German developmental co-operation agencies and Afghan agricultural engi-
neers living in Germany who have already carried out studies on revitalising the agricul-
ture sector. 
• A focus on the activities in rural areas of Afghanistan. This is desirable because many 
foreign NGOs are mainly active in Kabul. Given their specific knowledge of their home-
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land, Afghan Diaspora organisations appear to be more apt to assume the risks associ-
ated with establishing projects in rural areas.     
B) The promotion of activities related to the social infrastructure 
• Fellowship programs could open the German University in Cairo and similar institutions 
to all those who may be interested.   
• In Afghanistan such projects would require support for the reconstruction and develop-
ment of the educational sector. The greatest need is for support in qualifying teaching 
personnel.    
• In the area of healthcare provision, qualified personnel is also needed in Afghanistan. 
Here, for example, fellowships for the further education or specialist education of medical 
doctors could help, as well as exchanges at international congresses.   
• In general, it is to be noted that the exchange and transfer of knowledge in the areas of 
education, research, healthcare, or in other areas, would be desirable for all three coun-
tries.  This can take place at various levels (for students, instructors or professors). 
C) The promotion of the political participation of the Diaspora   
• Our analysis shows that the Serbians have a strong political interest in their homeland. 
However, despite the fact that they had the legal rights to take part in the 2004 election, 
the majority of Serbians in Germany did not do so because of the significant effort it re-
quired. Here, bilateral support for the Serbian government in developing an efficient elec-
tion procedure should be considered (e.g. through absentee mail ballots and so on).  
D) The promotion of the existing Diaspora structures   
• Promotion of reciprocal contacts between government agencies in Egypt and the Egyp-
tian Diaspora in Germany.   
• The quasi-return, mostly of successful businessmen from the Egyptian Diaspora, can be 
used to multiply the knowledge of the forms of involvement, as well as the possibilities 
and prospects they entail. 
• In the Diaspora, there are individual actors who are interested, competent and commit-
ted, but who do not have access to the necessary financial resources. Here, too, it would 
be possible to provide support. 
• Strong fractions within the Diaspora – in particular in the Afghan Diaspora – hamper ef-
fective involvement relevant for development. The activities are often not bundled where 
it appears sensible for them to be. A co-ordination site to organise the exchanges of and 
links between ongoing work and projects could serve as a corrective.    
• Beyond that, it would be desirable to increase the professionalisation of Diaspora pro-
jects (e.g. through country-specific seminars on fund raising for Afghanistan and Serbia, 
etc.).  
• Special attention should be paid to second generation immigrants who take a special 
interest in their country of origin and thus might be able to serve as intercultural interme-
diaries. This is true for all three countries.   
• A strong interest was shown in further information about the structure of the Diaspora 
itself, the breadth of it, and the various activities in the countries of origin that are based 
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in it. An information centre could provide data on possibilities for involvement (possibili-
ties for assistance, the focus of investments, etc.). Beyond that, information on involve-
ment and successful projects would facilitate organisations’ evaluation of their own work 
and could also serve as something of an exchange for best practices.  
E) The development of legal and political conditions in the receiving country   
In principle, the migrants who contribute the most to the development of their countries of 
origin are those who, on the basis of a permanent residence permit and the equal opportunity 
to access the labour market, have acquired a good social standing in the receiving country 
and are thus well-integrated there.  
• A higher level of integration, as well as good social standing, contributes to the activity of 
Diaspora members. The potentials of migration can only be developed if all three parties 
are benefited – first the migrants, then the receiving country (through their integration), 
and finally, on this basis, the country of origin. The integration of migrants would thus 
promote “brain circulation”.  
• In this context, allowing double citizenship is also important. The loss of citizenship in the 
country of origin may be accompanied by the loss of voting rights and the loss of the right 
to acquire real estate. It may also entail a visa requirement for later entry into the coun-
try. Allowing double citizenship thus may be one fitting strategy to support the involve-
ment of immigrants living in Germany in the development of their countries of origin. 
As a consequence, a migration and integration policy with the objective of promoting the 
social integration of the migrants will at the same time promote the Diaspora migrants in their 
involvement with their countries of origin. Such a migration policy, which includes a compre-
hensive integration policy, is simultaneously a good developmental policy. It taps the re-
sources of those concerned and attempts to mobilise them for development. In this context, it 
is significant to note our impression that many migrants in the Diaspora communities (and 
their networks) possess specific and valuable knowledge that ought to be taken account of in 
drafting future developmental policy strategies. Thus, it would be valuable to reflect on the 
ways in which representatives of the Diaspora communities might be integrated into devel-
opmental policy bodies as advisors. 
F) International co-operation  
• Through remittances, members of the Diaspora have a significant impact on their coun-
tries of origin. The issue is not only debated extensively at the national level, but also at 
the international level. As many international organisations have advocated, it is impor-
tant to develop transparent and cheaper systems for remittances.    
• In addition, an international (or bilateral) exchange  among receiving countries of larger 
Diaspora communities is worth considering. Beyond that, reflections on the potentials 
connected with assisting the international networking of the respective Diaspora could be 




The interest in the contribution of Diaspora communities to the development in their coun-
tries of origin results from the insight that, in the course of their migration experience, mi-
grants remain involved in different social relationships both in  the region they have departed 
from and in the region they have migrated to. In this, migration is understood as a process 
that remains significant for various aspects of life across generations. From the developmen-
tal perspective, precisely this accounts, in various ways, for the relevance of migrants for 
their countries of origin.   
Objectives of this Study 
On the basis of empirical evidence, it is presumed that various general conditions have a 
significant impact on the character of migrants’ relationships to their countries of origin. 
Viewed systematically, these concern:     
• the migrants themselves (their human capital), 
• the reasons for their migration (work, education, flight, family/marriage), 
• the social conditions in the receiving country and the social integration existing there,   
• the social conditions in the country of origin and the position of the migrants or their fami-
lies there,   
• the social forms of organisation (structure of the Diaspora). 
These conditions map out the frame of reference that served as the basis for this study. One 
main objective of this study was to develop concrete questions and a suitable research de-
sign for dealing with the question of the effect of migration on development. This is neces-
sary given the lack of clarity in the discussion of the contexts and causes and effects at play 
here. 
The contributions of the various communities to the development in their countries of ori-
gin ought to make it possible to concretely investigate these matters and thus to develop a 
realistic assessment of them.   
Methodology and Structure of the Study 
This study primarily relies on about 80 guiding interviews carried out with Egyptian, Af-
ghan and Serbian migrants who – through procured addresses, Internet searches and snow-
ball effects – were identified as key figures, leaders of central organisations and persons 
responsible for transfer activities in the communities, or well-known representatives of their 
respective migrant groups. In this, the interviews with Egyptian migrants were carried out in 
Frankfurt, Munich and Berlin; those with Afghans were carried out in Hamburg, Berlin, Co-
logne, Bonn, Bochum, Detmold, Hagen, Freiburg and Karlsruhe; those with Serbians were 
carried out in Berlin, Frankfurt, Munich, Hamburg, Bonn and Bielefeld.  
Studies on the number of migrants and the habitation of the migrant groups under inves-
tigation have shown that leaders of active organisations, or a larger percentage of the mi-
grant populations, live in these cities. The possibility of gaining access to them there thus 
seemed certain. This study makes no claims to being representative. The following were 
core objectives of the interviews:  
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• to make transfer routes and contexts accessible about which no or little knowledge yet 
exists, but only conjectures – for example, the Deutsche Bundesbank’s unpublished data 
on payment statistics does not allow conclusions to be drawn about remittance transfer 
flows;  
• to gain insights into the costs of monetary transfers, the forms and structures of transfer 
channels, the stability and reliability of the banking industry, the state finance policy, as 
well as practical transfer agents;  
• to find out which social bonds establish or obstruct lasting commitments to social, politi-
cal and cultural transfer activities and to the participation in public or private projects in 
the country of origin.  
Care was taken to ensure that the questionnaires included the dimensions differentiated 
in the frame of reference under question (characteristics of migrants, reasons for migration, 
social integration and involvement, social forms of organisation, conditions in the country of 
origin). 
 Beyond evaluating the interviews, the subsequent report also evaluates other materials. 
In particular, these include various documents (academic articles and research reports; 
documents from national sites, such as the Deutsche Bundesbank, as well as international 
organisations, such as the World Bank, the Global Commission on International Migration, 
the International Monetary Fund, the International Organization for Migration, etc.), websites, 
brochures, annual reports of organisations and associations, as well as statistics  (i.e. from 
the German Office for Refugees and Migration, the German Federal Statistical Office, and 
visa statistics from the German Federal Foreign Office, etc.).  
Beyond that, within the framework of the study, interviews were carried out in Egypt and 
Serbia with representatives of their governments and political administrations, companies, 
banks, business chambers, universities and schools, as well as with migrants who had re-
turned to their countries of origin and representatives of German organisations such as the 
Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Chamber of Commerce, 
the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), as well as the German Academic Exchange Ser-
vice (DAAD). This has provided insight into the ways in which the activities and their effects 
on the countries of origin are registered and judged there, particularly from the vantage point 
of the political and economic organisations. Given the time limitations and the limited finan-
cial resources of this study, we have refrained from carrying out a similar investigation in Af-
ghanistan.   
In what follows, the results of the evaluation of the collected materials will be presented 
with a view to the outlined frame of reference. First, an overview is offered of the three inves-
tigated migrant groups in Germany, as well as the individual country studies (Section 2). In 
that section the various immigration histories and forms of immigration for the three groups 
are presented. The type of migration (labour migration, forced political migration, student 
migration or family reunification) characteristic for the groups under study are explicated, for 
these have proven to be relevant for the relationship to the regions of origin and the type of 
transfer activity engaged in. Then the social integration of the three groups are taken up – to 
the degree possible, particularly their legal residence status, their integration into the labour 
market, their employment status levels, their level of education and vocational training, their 
income and family status. As is to be demonstrated in what follows, the social integration of 
the migrants in the immigration context – the differing levels of access, in particular to mone-
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tary, vocational/professional and political resources – is decisive for their capacity to engage 
in lasting, sustainable transfer activities. Then the various forms of engagement and the ac-
tivities of the migrants in their countries of origin are addressed (Section 3): An overview of 
their economic transactions is offered. Specifically the focus of these activities is examined, 
along with the conditions under which they take place and their significance for the develop-
ment of the infrastructure in the countries of origin and for their political involvement. These 
results are always presented in comparative perspective.  
We then look into the forms of organisation of the migrant groups under study and inquire 
into their significance for mobilising migrants to address problems in their regions of origin 
and countries of origin and their willingness to get involved economically, socially or politi-
cally. Although we do not claim that the results are representative, on the basis of our re-
search and interviews, we do believe that we have covered organisations relevant for the 
migrant groups investigated here.   
For clarification, a methodological comment is to be made here: In carrying out our study, 
we did not presume the existence of Egyptian, Serbian or Afghan Diaspora or communities. 
The latter two concepts entail strong assumptions about social constellations valid among 
migrants.1 We do not presume these here, but do, where fitting, indicate their relevance for 
the issues being investigated. Beyond that, the general concepts have an inherent tendency 
towards homogenisation, while in reality there is a sizeable social heterogeneity even among 
migrants from a single country of origin. Our inquiry is concerned with the detailed effects of 
immigrants on their regions of origin. This is based on the assumption that, in the course of 
migration projects that span numerous generations, migrants remain integrated in transna-
tional social relationships of an economic, legal, political, familial and cultural nature, which 
include both the region of origin and the target region. Against this background, the self-
organisations of the migrants provide a good starting point for this study: On the one hand, 
they serve as empirically accessible addresses for gathering information. On the other hand, 
in contrast to formal organisations, the capacity of these organisations to act is dependent on 
the motives of the organisations’ members, and the more or less successful mobilisation of 
those members.2 In this context, the degree to which the mobilisation is structured by the 
members’ motives – be they ethnic or national, or communal (vergemeinschaftend) or social 
(vergesellschaftend) (Weber, 1972) – becomes apparent. In addition, the type of issue – 
economic, political, social or cultural – that the organisations focus on becomes significant.  
Economic transactions here include, first of all, money flows, which are interpreted with 
no further differentiation as remittances. However, other transactions are to be distinguished: 
for example, those in which migrants make income available to their remaining family (other 
others) and investment transactions oriented towards making a profit. Beyond that, economic 
transactions include import and export business with the country of origin. Activities oriented 
towards the social infrastructure are those that in one way or another are oriented towards 
the problem of providing common goods, in particular, in the areas of education, healthcare, 
transportation or science. Here it is to be taken into account that, in countries where goods 
such as education, science or healthcare are primarily, or, in part, provided by the market, 
migrants can become active as entrepreneurs in these areas. That differs from contexts 
                                                
1 These are related to the forms of conjoint orientation to the country of origin as well as the more or less wide-reaching so-
cial cohesion of these groups (Vergemeinschaftung). On the idea of the Diaspora, cp. Cohen, 1999.  
2 On the difference between formal organisations and associations, self-organisation, etc. cp. Luhmann, 2000 and Stichweh, 
2000. 
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where such goods are – or are supposed to be – provided by the state. In this case, migrants 
may substitute for the wanting state service in their country of origin. As will be shown below, 
this difference proves to be relevant for the different kinds of involvement among Egyptian, 
Afghan and Serbian migrants. By contrast, activities with a political orientation are those that 
are primarily concerned with producing political decisions, that are involved with these deci-
sions or the structures in which they are made or that are able to be mobilised with a political 
dynamic in these countries.  
Section 4 formulates the conclusions and some recommendations.   
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2. Description of the Diaspora Communities 
2.1. The Egyptian Diaspora in Germany 
2.1.1. Egyptian Student Migrants: The Rotary Clubs 
The majority of immigrants from Egypt to Germany have traditionally been male students 
of the upper middle class (Schmidt-Fink, 2001). They have studied linguistics and cultural 
studies, natural sciences and engineering.3 These students began coming in the 1950s, and 
this tradition of student migration has continued to today. In 2001, 58% of all Egyptian citi-
zens who came to Germany did so for educational purposes. In 2003 and 2004, 76% of the 
Egyptian migrants were student migrants (Table 2). In total, just under 14,500 Egyptian citi-
zens now live in Germany. Egyptian authorities give the much higher number of 24,000. The 
difference in the data derives from the different procedures for statistically measuring emi-
grants and immigrants in the countries of origin and the receiving countries. In receiving 
countries, often only first generation immigrants who possess a foreign passport are counted. 
The naturalised migrants and migrant children who have a right to citizenship in the receiving 
country often are not included in the immigration statistics.4 
Table 1: Immigration Data of Egyptian Citizens to Germany   
Year Incoming Outgoing 
1988      2,400 (*)  
1995      1,600 (*)  
2000 1,742 1,327 
2001 1,917 1,361 
2002 1,870 1,348 
2003 1,592 1,512 
2004 1,446 1,458 
Source: German Federal Statistical Office,  VI B, Migration statistic 
(*) Data from: (2001), International Migration Statistics in the Mediterranean Countries: Current Data Sources and Statistics 
Available from International Organisations, Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities: 47. 
In comparison to migrants from other Arab countries and Turkey, Egyptian student mi-
grants have been able to establish themselves quite well in Germany. This immigrant group 
has high percentages of naturalisation (Table 3) and a high percentage of marriages with 
German partners (Gesemann, 1995). Beyond that, a relatively large share of Egyptian mi-
grants are highly skilled (14.6%: Gesemann, 1995). The well-situated Egyptian student mi-
grants have founded numerous associations and professional interest organisations. Fur-
thermore, they are active in German politics. Beyond that, they have co-founded various 
Muslim and Coptic communities.5 In this study, however, we have concentrated on the secu-
                                                
3 In 1992, for example, 30.8% of the Egyptian students in Germany were studying engineering, 24.5%, communication and 
cultural sciences, as well as sports, and 23.6% were studying mathematics and the natural sciences (Gesemann, 1995).   
4 On the  problems and particularities of comparing the immigration statistics from Med-MENA countries, cp. Fargues, 2005. 
5 The self-organisation of Egyptian migrants in line with religious criteria is, by the way, another differentiating characteristic 
in shaping migrant networks. In the 1950s, after the assault on Egyptian President Nasser, some representatives of the religious 
intelligencia fled to various states, including Germany. They became a part of the Islamic elite in Germany. They founded 
mosques and assumed leadership positions in the Islamic associations. One Islamic organisations in Germany, which was 
founded by Egyptian Muslim activists and is still dominated by them, is the Islamic Community In Germany [Islamische Gemein-
schaft in Deutschland] (IGD). The first Islamic centre of the community was founded in the 1960s in Munich under the direction 
of one of the most important activists of the Muslim Brotherhood. According to the IGD president, the members of IGD now co-
ordinate around 60 Islamic communities nationwide. The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution estimates that 
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lar organisations and networks of the well-situated Egyptian migrants because the activities 
of the migrants in these groups are prominent in their country of origin.  
Table 2: Egyptian students from Abroad and Those with Permanent Residence in Germany 
(absolute numbers) 




dence in Germany 
2001 1,125 66 
2002 1,222 56 
2003 1,211 53 
2004 1,124 68 
Source: Wissenschaft-Weltoffen, 2005 
Table 3: Egyptians Naturalised in Germany 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Numbers (abso-
lute) 
423 465 443 437 381 
Source: German Federal Statistical Office, Wiesbaden, 2005 
Already in the 1960s, there were regular meetings of Egyptian students in Germany. 
Such groups existed in Darmstadt, Stuttgart, Munich, Dusseldorf, Hamburg and Heidelberg. 
Few of these were registered as associations with the German officials. The first groups were 
something like extended circles of friends. They were often initially based on friendships able 
to be traced back to family contacts and ties in Egypt. During their studies, many formed new 
acquaintances in Germany. Some of these student groups later were established as cultural 
clubs. Their active members now consist of professional, successful Egyptians. During the 
1970s and 1980s, further Egyptian cultural clubs and professional unions were founded. In 
1983, in order to strengthen the existing informal contacts among associations, 24 Egyptian 
associations and professional unions joined together to form the “Egyptian House”, an um-
brella organisation of Egyptian organisations in Germany.6 
The Egyptian professional elite in Germany is nationally connected in this way. The net-
work is publicly represented through the respective cultural and professional clubs and the 
umbrella organisation. Viewed from outside, it is held together by a common ethnic origin. 
The associations define themselves as “Egyptian associations”. In the official association 
statutes, Egyptian heritage is usually the most important membership criterion. In reality, 
however, admission to this network is only open to people of a certain social status. Some 
associations select by means of higher membership fees; in other associations, different ex-
clusory mechanisms are at work such as demeanour, relationships or family background. 
                                                                                                                                                     
there are around 1,300 active members of IGD (Verfassungsschutzbericht 2004, www.bmi.bund.de or 
www.verfassungsschutz.de). In the 1960s the first Copt immigrants from Egypt came to Germany. Egyptian Christians were 
primarily student migrants. Approximately 66% of them had a university degree (Ibrahim, 2000). Over half the Egyptian Copts in 
Germany married Germans. Over half of all Copts have been naturalised (Ibrahim, 2000). The official number of Copts in Ger-
many today runs at around 5,000 (Ibrahim, 2005). At the beginning of the 1990s, Copts founded two monasteries with the sup-
port of Christian churches in Germany, which serve as culture and meeting centres. In all, there are now 12 active Copt com-
munities in Germany.   
6 In Germany, there are also Egyptian associations that are not a part of the German Egyptian House. It would be interesting 
to find out how these associations are organised, what relationship they have to the Egyptian House and what tasks they as-
sume. In this pilot study, however, it was not possible systematically to include these “independent“ associations.   
7 
Finally, the core members are people who are professionally successful in Germany or who 
come from important Egyptian families. Religious affiliation, by contrast, hardly plays a role. 
The form of self-organisation of the highly qualified Egyptians thus resembles that of Rotary 
Clubs in certain respects. Like Rotary Clubs, the Egyptian associations in Germany serve to 
reproduce, stabilise and strengthen their own elite networks.7 
Table 4: Immigrants from Egypt in the Selected Bundesländer 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Baden-Württemberg 1,507 1,507 1,466 1,176 
Bavaria 1,460 1,528 1,551 1,230 
Berlin 1,678 1,783 1,789 1,810 
Hamburg 1,559 1,635 1,677 1,698 
Hessen 1,628 1,571 1,556 1,262 
North Rhine-Westphalia 2,257 2,298 2,271 1,920 
Source: Compiled from the foreign statistics of the German Federal Statistical Office, Wiesbaden 
2.1.2. Egyptian Marital Immigrants, Refugees and Irregular Immigrants: Weakly Or-
ganised Networks   
A small group of legal immigrants from Egypt are individuals who enter the country for 
family reunification, usually as the result of a marriage with a German spouse. These are 
normally middle class men who move to be together with their German wives. Between 1984 
and 1992, however, a certain number of asylum seekers also came to Germany. In particu-
lar, there was a sharp rise in the number of Egyptian applicants for asylum in 1991 and 1992, 
but this number once again rapidly fell after the “asylum compromise” in 1993. The reason 
most applicants appealed to was persecution because of religious affiliation. Many were 
Egyptian Christians, more precisely, Copts. Another group consisted of members of the Mus-
lim Brotherhood, which was illegal in Egypt. The acceptance quota from both of these groups 
was no more than 1.2%. Nevertheless, it can be assumed that some applicants for asylum of 
Egyptian origin have permanently settled in Germany (Gesemann, 1995). In addition, since 
the beginning of the 1990s, irregular immigrants of Egyptian origin have continuously entered 
Germany. There is little information about their precise numbers and social background. All 
that is known is that, in the 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s, there were organised 
smugglings of Egyptians across the border at a price of up to DM 10,000. We can thus pre-
sume that it was not the poorer who managed to come to the West, but those from middle 
class families (cp. Elwert, 2002). 
In the 1980s and 1990s, it was therefore mainly Egyptian migrants from the middle class 
that entered Germany in the ways depicted. Little is known about the social situation of these 
migrants. It can be presumed that, like migrants with similar immigrant patterns, they have 
                                                
7 Not all Egyptian professionals are connected with this relatively closed network, which was formed from the 1960s to the 
1980s. Some Egyptian intellectuals are not active in pure Egyptian assemblies, but in Arab ones (for examples, see Gesemann, 
1995). Many have no interest in participating in these associations, although they are often in contact with association members. 
In particular, Egyptian students who have very recently come to Germany, and second generation Egyptians in Germany are 
hardly active in the Egyptian associations. The associations’ members are getting older, and their activities are gradually wind-
ing down. The board of directors of the Egyptian House has recognised this problem and established the goal of opening the 
association to young members. The umbrella organisation wants to improve its Internet site since young people would prefer 
loose relationships over the Internet. Other strategies for supporting new members are also being pursued. One Egyptian cul-
tural association intends to change its statutes to ease the access of younger association members to the board of directors. 
Besides that, it has taken on the job of supporting newly arriving Egyptian students at a local university. 
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more difficulties gaining access to the German educational and labour markets (cp. Bommes 
1999). The legal status of their residence is unclear, at least for those who came in the first 
years. Moreover, their educational degrees are not recognised in Germany. The lack of suffi-
cient knowledge of German is a further difficulty. Against this background, many of them ex-
perience a decline in social status relative to that of their families in their country of origin. 
These migrants presumably depend on personal networks, which primarily help them secure 
employment, income, housing and other forms of social support in the immigration context.    
Within the framework of this pilot study, this group of Egyptian migrants and their support 
networks were not further investigated. The empirical study primarily focusses on self-
organised groups of migrants. Here, however, we do not come across any organisations that 
include or represent these structurally weakly positioned Egyptian migrants. The Egyptians 
we interviewed presume that these migrants would tend to be found in Muslim organisations. 
In addition, the literature indicates the existence of organisations formally recognised as as-
sociations, but which factually function as small companies (mostly travel agencies). These 
are said to be operated by Egyptian immigrants with a relatively low social status (Gese-
mann, 1995). 
2.2. The Afghan Diaspora in Germany 
2.2.1. Structure, Distribution and Immigration Phases 
According to the data of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment, approximately 100,000 Afghan migrants have settled in Germany.8 This rough 
estimation includes Afghan citizens and Germans of Afghan origin. Because the latter cate-
gory is no longer registered with the Foreign Central Registry [Ausländerzentralregister] 
(AZR), the following demographic data only relates to those with Afghan citizenship.  
Table 5: Afghan Population from 2001-2004 by Gender 
Year male female total 
2001 39,766 31,896 71,662 
2002 38,193 30,823 69,016 
2003 36,179 29,651 65,830 
2004 31,321 26,612 57,933 
German Federal Statistical Office, Wiesbaden, 2005  
In December 2004, according to the Federal Statistical Office of Germany, a total of 
57,933 Afghan citizens lived in the German Federal Republic, of which 50,457 were born 
abroad and 7,476 were born in Germany. The number of men outweighs that of women by 
about 5,000, but the difference has decreased in the past few years (Table 5). While all age 
groups are represented, 60% of all Afghans living in Germany are under the age of 30 (Fig-
ure 1). Nearly two-thirds of the Afghan population in Germany live in Hamburg, Hessen and 
North Rhine-Westphalia, whereby Hamburg has the largest Afghan population in Germany 
(and Europe), with 14,469 registered inhabitants (Table 6).9  Afghans have preferred to settle 
in urban centres. Their concentration in particular Bündesländer and cities is because ex-
                                                
8 See http://www2.gtz.de/migration-and-development/konferenz-2/deutsch/afghanen.htm. 
9 For the differences in the social structure of the Afghan population in the mentioned Bundesländer, see, Horr et al, 1989. 
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tended family initially moved there, and there are better chances for acquiring work within the 
larger communities already settled there.   
Table 6: Regional Distribution of the Afghan Population in Germany, Stand 31 Dec. 2004 
 Male female total 
Baden-Württemberg 1,674 1,286 2,960 
Bavaria 4,634 3,351 7,985 
Berlin 441 349 790 
Brandenburg 329 196 525 
Bremen 189 170 359 
Hamburg 7,655 6,814 14,469 
Hessen 7,370 6,551 13,921 
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania  70 21 91 
Lower Saxony 1,902 1,678 3,580 
North Rhine-Westphalia 4,881 4,533 9,414 
Rhineland-Palatinate   758 638 1,396 
Saarland 51 35 86 
Saxony 861 512 1,373 
Saxony-Anhalt 67 25 92 
Schleswig-Holstein 706 548 1,254 
Thuringia 42 15 57 
Source: German Federal Statistical Office, Wiesbaden, 2005 
Before 1979 fewer than 2,000 Afghans lived in Germany; these were primarily business-
men and students. In particular, Hamburg, as a port city, drew Afghan businessmen, among 
them many carpet dealers, who founded businesses there because of the warehousing. In 
the 1960s and 1970s, numerous (mostly male) students also came, including some of those 
we interviewed. They studied various disciplines, but primarily medicine and engineering. 
With the outbreak of the war in Afghanistan, many refugees sought asylum in Germany.10 In 
the course of the 1980s, and, in particular, the 1990s, the Afghan population increased 
sharply, and by 2000, 72,199 Afghan citizens were living in Germany (Figure 2). After that, 
the number of Afghan migrants in Germany fell: for one, this can be explained by the lower 
number of new asylum applicants after 2001 (Table 7); for another, by the number of those 
naturalised (Figure 4). There are three immigrant waves of Afghan refugees connected with 
different phases of war and the respective relationships of political power.11 In the first phase, 
which followed the takeover of power by the communist DVPA in 1978 and the Soviet inva-
sion of 1979, refugees were primarily members of the western-oriented educated elite (e.g. 
university professors, teachers and students), high-ranking public officials or well-situated 
businessmen, who encountered, or feared, the repression of the communist regime. After the 
                                                
10 The violent conflict in Afghanistan since the end of the 1970s has produced a very large refugee Diaspora. While most Af-
ghan refugees sought protection in neighbouring Pakistan and Iran – at the end of the 1980s, around 3 million Afghan refugees 
lived in both countries (cp. UNHCR Afghan Refugee Statistics, Sep. 2001). A minority, who had the necessary economic and 
social resources, managed to migrate to the West. In Europe, Germany was the most important country of destination for the 
Afghan refugees. Since the beginning of the 20th century, close institutional and economic relationships had developed be-
tween the two countries, which offered points of contact for an escape route to Germany  (cp. Schetter, 2004).  
11 For more on the various refugee phases, see, for example, Centlivres-Demont, 2000 und Tietjens, 2002. 
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takeover of power by the mujahideen in 1992, people fled the country who had belonged to 
or worked for the communist regime or were associated with it.12 The third phase began with 
the ascendancy of the Taliban, from their takeover of Kabul in 1996 to the deposition of the 
fundamentalist regime in 2001. As a result of the repressive politics of the Taliban – in par-
ticular, the repression of women – members of the urban middle class who had held out until 
then made attempts to immigrate to the West.  Ethnic and religious minorities also increas-
ingly left the country – for example, Shiite Hazaras, the Ismailis, Hindus, Sikhs – whose lives 
were threatened by the extremist Taliban.13 
Figure 1: Afghan Citizens by Age Group, Stand 31 Dec. 2004 
Age Group 
















































Source: German Federal Statistical Office, Wiesbaden, 2005 
Note: 1967 to 1990 – earlier federal territory; from 1991 – Germany; because of the revision of the Foreign Central  Registry 
(AZR) in 2004, the data in the years previous to that are only comparable to a limited degree. 
                                                
12 Besides that, directly after the fall of the Berlin wall, numerous Afghan fellowship holders went to universities of the former 
East bloc states in the West (cp. Centlivres-Demont, 2000). For information on Afghan student migrants to the German Democ-
ratic Republic (GDR), see, for example, Hötzeldt et al. and Zamani, 2000.  
13 Not all left Afghanistan because of political persecution. People also fled because of the bombings and other dangers con-
nected with the war conflicts. According to our interview partners, in the 1980s many people came to Germany from Herat and 
Kandahar because these cities were especially affected by the war. During the fighting between the rivalling muhjahideen at the 
beginning of the 1990s, Kabul, in particular, was under permanent siege; as a result, the main city population was forced to flee. 
Besides that, for many, economic reasons motivated the migration to Germany. They wanted to earn money here in order to be 
able to support their families in Pakistan and Afghanistan.   
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While the first refugees were nearly exclusively from among the elite, as time passed, Af-
ghans who were not as well-off or as well-educated increasingly came to Germany (Tietjens, 
2002). It was not uncommon for these refugees to have to sell their property and go in debt 
to pay for their emigration. Sometimes they were also supported by members of the Diaspora 
in Germany. Given the different motivations and different social makeup in the immigration 
waves from Afghanistan, the migrant population is very heterogeneous. Afghans in Germany 
differ considerably in regard to their religious and political orientation, their educational back-
ground and their social strata. 
2.2.2. Residence Status, Educational Background and Vocational Qualifications 
Afghan migrants in Germany possess differing forms of residence status. About 40% 
have German citizenship. Between 1981 and 2004, a total of 37,456 people were naturalised 
(Figure 4). In comparison to other migrants in Germany, the number of cases of naturalisa-
tion among the inhabitants of Afghan origin is relatively high.14 Among the Afghans without a 
German passport, 80% possess a more or less stable residence status (Figure 3) and just 
under 17% have the German Duldung status (which is a statutory temporary suspension of 
deportation).15 One’s residence status has a large influence on the social opportunities avail-
able in Germany. As a rule, those with Duldung status, as well as those currently seeking 
asylum, are not allowed to study at university or to attend a vocational school; they are also 
subject to work restrictions. Moreover, they are not allowed to leave the region they are as-
signed to inhabit while in this status.  
Table 7: Asylum Applicants with Afghan Citizenship from 1995-2004 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Asylum 
Applicants 
7.515 5.663 4.735 3.768 4.458 5.380 5.837 2.772 1.473 918 
Source: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF) 
The majority of Afghans who have moved to countries in the West are from the cities, 
and, on average, they have a higher educational level than those coming from Afghanistan’s 
countryside (Centlivres-Demont, 2000). In a study of the AGEF (a working group on devel-
opment and professionals in the area of migration and technical co-operation) from 2002 on 
the skilled-labour potential of Afghan migrants in Germany (it also included Germans of Af-
ghan origin), 30.9% of those surveyed indicated that they possessed the matriculation stan-
dard for university, and 18.2% indicated that they had a college degree. According to the 
study, the best represented vocational groups among Afghans are teachers, architects, engi-
neers, medical doctors and nurses. However, this positive assessment must be relativised, 
for in many cases the degrees, including doctorates, were acquired long ago, and only a 
                                                
14 In 2000 the naturalisation percentage among Afghans was 6.61%, and that of all foreigners was 2.56% (Tietjens, 2002). 
15 The different residence permits are connected with the time of the immigration and changes in the German asylum and 
immigration policy. Until 1980 Afghan citizens could enter Germany without a visa and remain in the country for three months. 
Against the background of the cold war, at the beginning of the 1980s, Afghans were accepted as “victims of communist ag-
gression”, and they were generally very quickly granted a right to asylum. This changed in the further course of the 1980s, and 
in 1988 74% of the applications for asylum were rejected (Horr et al., 1989) In the 1990s nearly all of their applications for asy-
lum were rejected because, in the wake of the civil war, no state institutions any longer existed in Afghanistan, and thus state 
persecution could no longer be demonstrated (Hötzeldt et al). Refugees, who often entered irregularly or with false papers, had 
hardly any chance of getting recognition on the basis of the asylum law or the Geneva 1951 Refugee Convention. Their stay 
was merely tolerated on humanitarian grounds or because of a general deportation stop to Afghanistan (Arendt-Rojan et al., 
2005; Gehrig, 2004).  
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small percentage of those surveyed have had the opportunity to acquire vocational experi-
ence in their learned professions in Germany. This has been a consequence of the work limi-
tations associated with immigration and asylum law.16 They have thus often had to accept 
jobs that they were overqualified for, and they have received no further training in their 
learned professions. Those we interviewed presume, by contrast, that second generation 
immigrants, who are still receiving their education or who have recently received their de-
grees, will have better chances. The Afghan migrants who have experienced social decline in 
the receiving country place particular value on the education of their children in the hope that 
a long-term investment in education will help them manage the risks of exile (Centlivres-
Demont, 2000 and Zulfacar, 1998).   
Figure 3: Afghan Citizens by Residence Status, Stand 31 Dec. 2004 
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Source: German Federal Statistical Office, Wiesbaden, 2005 
(The figure does not include the small number of people with EU residence permits – temporary: 42 people; and permanent: 12) 
Figure 4: Afghan Citizens Who were Naturalised 
Source: German Federal Statistical Office, Wiesbaden, 2005 
Note: Until 1990, earlier federal territories; from 199,1 Germany; 1997-1999 without Hamburg 
                                                













2.2.3. Social Interaction and Forms of Organisation 
Loyalties and friendships that originated in Afghanistan, as well as relationships with im-
mediate family and further relatives, are of great importance. In addition, social networks 
within the Afghan Diaspora obviously play a major role. On the basis of the information and 
materials available to us, a detailed view of their inner structure and of the ways they work 
cannot be offered. In what follows, we will address comprehensive perspectives emphasised 
in the social interactions among the Afghan migrants active in associations.    
The Afghans in Germany have differing ethnic backgrounds, regional origins and mother 
tounges. The Tajiks and Pashtuns form the largest groups; beyond that, in particular, there 
are Hazaras, Uzbeks, Nuristanis, groups from the Pashai speaking regions, as well as Hin-
dus and Sikhs (AGEF, 2002). According to those we interviewed, some associations only 
have members of a particular ethnic group, for example, Pashtuns, even if such exclusivity is 
not written into the association statutes. Migrants of the same regional or local origin foster 
intensive contact with one another, and in one case this regional identity was the obvious 
basis for founding an association, which aimed to support the reconstruction of the infrastruc-
ture in the members’ home region. In addition, ethnic affiliation and/or a shared regional ori-
gin are usually coupled with a common mother tongue, as the basis for mutual understand-
ing. However, the significance of ethnicity in the process of setting social boundaries is to be 
viewed with caution; according to Nassery (2003), social status is much more important for 
the internal structure of the Diaspora.  
A further significant criterion is religious affiliation. The large majority of Afghans are ei-
ther Sunni or Shiite Muslims. According to Tietjens (2002), the percentage of Shiite Muslims 
in Germany is relatively high in comparison to the population in Afghanistan because many 
members of the persecuted Shiite minority fled through Iran to Europe. Among the Afghans 
in Germany, the Afghan Hindus and Sikhs are a self-contained group, with a strong inward 
orientation (Daume, 2004). They have founded associations in a series of German cities, 
joined under a Hindu and Sikh umbrella organisation that champions their members’ inter-
ests in Germany. 
The political background of the Afghan migrants is an important basis for group formation 
and internal boundaries. In the 1960s and 1970s, students from Afghanistan joined associa-
tions, mostly leftest in orientation and influenced by the political movements of the 1960s.17 
Today these are no longer active, but some of these former students have established aid 
organisations that are active in developmental work in Afghanistan. In addition, second gen-
eration Afghans have again founded numerous Afghan student and youth associations with 
the aim of networking within Germany and supporting student and youth exchanges in Af-
ghanistan. In the 1980s Afghan migrants founded political associations that were supportive 
of the respective different opposition parties that were involved in conflict in Afghanistan. 
Among these are various Islamisist resistance groups (mujahideen), royalists, Maoists or 
small liberal parties. Later, members of or adherents to the deposed communist government 
founded their own associations; most of these had come as refugees at the beginning of the 
1990s. In this way, the organisation structure mirrors the political camps in Afghanistan’s 
conflicts and reproduces a constellation of its conflicts in Germany.   
                                                
17 In 1968, the General Union of Afghan Foreign Students [Generalunion afghanischer Studenten im Ausland] (GUAFS) was 
founded. 
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Afghan women in Germany have joined forces in diverse associations with the aim of im-
proving the situation of women and girls in Afghanistan.18 They work to establish networks, 
initiate and and supervise educational and vocational projects for women and girls and carry 
out political public relations work to throw light on the situation of women in Afghanistan. The 
members of these groups that we questioned are scattered throughout Germany, span vari-
ous generations and have differing social backgrounds.   
 In addition to matters related to the common cultural background, numerous associa-
tions simultaneously offer an organisational basis for Afghans working in the same profes-
sions. In particular, Afghan medical doctors and other medical professionals are organised in 
Germany.19 In 2002 eight associations joined together in the Governing Body of Medical Pro-
fessionals and their Colleagues in German speaking Nations [Dachverband des mediz-
inischen Fachpersonals und deren Kollegen im deutschsprachigen Raum] (DAMF e.V.) 
(Medicana Afghanica, 2003). Its objective is to improve healthcare in Afghanistan. Beyond 
that, one association is committed to matters of interest to Afghan medical doctors in Ger-
many. For example, it deals with matters related to the recognition of degrees or to limita-
tions to practicing of one’s profession due to provisions of the law concerning immigrants. In 
addition, Afghan engineers and technicians have founded two associations: the Association 
of Engineers and Technicians in Germany [Verein afghanischer Ingenieure und Techniker in 
Deutschland ] (VAIT e.V.) and the Society for Agricultural and Technical Development [Ge-
sellschaft für landwirtschaftliche und technische Entwicklung] (GltEA).20 They manage pro-
jects aimed at improving the infrastructure in Afghanistan, particularly in the energy sector. 
Furthermore, Afghan teachers21 are active in parental associations, and organise native lan-
guage courses in Hamburg.   
 It has been pointed out that the main perspectives described so far, which underlie 
the confraternities, networks and associations of the migrants, are not mutually exclusive, but 
are able to be combined with one another; so, for example, political orientations are related 
to religious orientations and ethnic groupings, and are especially to be found among a certain 
social strata.22 Moreover, it must be kept in mind that the majority of the Afghan associations 
in Germany are primarily concerned with structuring life in the receiving country. For exam-
ple, they facilitate the practice of religion by constructing sacred sites, or they reproduce cul-
tural traditions by organising joint celebrations. These must be differentiated from organisa-
tions that have been founded primarily with the aim of offering services in Afghanistan or 
assisting Afghan refugees in Pakistan. The professional associations or women’s associa-
tions are cases in point. Besides these, there are numerous other NGOs in Germany without 
                                                
18 This union was able to occur on the basis of a joint political orientation (e.g. at the DVPA - RAWA, an international network 
underground organisation of Afghan women), but it also transcended political associations, i.e. some women’s organisations 
were able to overcome political differences (e.g. Afghanisch-Deutsches-Frauenforum e.V. in Bonn). 
19 According the AGEF study already mentioned, 7.8% of those questioned indicated that they were medical doctors; a fur-
ther 7.6% indicated that they were nurses or other medical specialists.   
20 10.3% of the immigrants are architects, engineers and those in related professions. They thus constitute one of the largest 
occupational groups of Afghan migrants in Germany (AGEF, 2002). 
21 Teachers constitute the largest professional group of the Afghan Diaspora in Germany, 11.1%. 
22 For example, in the communist associations, there is a subdivision in line with the two wings of the PDPA (People’s De-
mocratic Party of Afghanistan), the Khalq and Parcham, whereby adherents of the Parcham wing tend to come from the upper 
echelons of society. Members of the engineers association come from the educated middle class, and the majority are gradu-
ates of the Amani High School in Kabul (here, accordingly, the professional group one belongs to and one’s social background 
are related). Furthermore, the Afghan Social Democratic Party is only to recruit Pashtuns (i.e. political orientation is connected 
with ethnicity).     
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a clearly defined membership, which are active in providing humanitarian aid and in co-
operative development work.23 
2.3. The Serbian Diaspora in Germany 
2.3.1. The Guest Workers: Serbian Clubs 
The massive recruitment of Yugoslavian guest workers to Germany began in 1961 and 
lasted until the general order to stop recruitment in 1973. In this time period, about 535,000 
Yugoslavian labourers came to Germany (Table 8). Over one-third of them were from Serbia; 
most of the others came from Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (Haberl, 1978). Initially, 
largely unskilled workers were recruited; as time progressed, however, better qualified, 
skilled labourers were recruited (Table 9). After the recruitment stop, and as a result of the 
return policy, about one-fourth of the Yugoslavian labourers returned to their country of origin 
(Malac'ic', 1996). Less qualified migrants, with poor prospects of finding further employment, 
were among those who returned. This meant an increase in the average qualification level of 
the Yugoslavians who remained in Germany (Haberl, 1978). The recruitment stop, however, 
did not just result in the exodus of less qualified labourers, but also in the immigration of the 
families of those immigrants who remained in Germany. Thus, the number of Yugoslavian 
citizens in Germany during the 1980s remained at roughly the same level, despite a consid-
erable exodus (Malac'ic', 1996). With the outbreak of the ethnic conflicts in Yugoslavia, the 
number of immigrants from the disintegrating Yugoslavia once again rose considerably. Be-
tween 1991 and 1997, approximately 300,000 people left the country; and just under half of 
them went to Germany and Austria (Simeunovic, 1997).24 The last immigrant wave finally 
came with the Kosovo conflict at the end of the 1990s.25 
Today, about 500,000 immigrants with Serbian citizenship live in Germany. The present 
immigration balance of Serbians in Germany is negative (Table 11). In other words, more 
Serbians are leaving the country than entering it. The politically forced return of refugees 
after the Kosovo conflict probably lies behind this sinking trend in the migration numbers. 
Together with the naturalised migrants, it is estimated that about 700,000 migrants of Ser-
bian origin live in Germany. Their social situation varies in accord with their residence status 
and the length of their stay. However, most of them came within the framework of the labour 
migration of the 1960s and 1970s and as part of the familial reunification moves in the wake 
of that. Their social situation is relatively secure. In 2004, 60% of them had a secure resi-
dence status (Table 10). The Yugoslavian labourers, like all of the earlier “guest workers”, 
were successively politically integrated via the labour unions and the alien resident represen-
tatives that were established in the municipal governments in the 1970s and 1980s. Given 
that many of these immigrants held permanent employment contracts for a number of years 
and were integrated into the German social state apparatus, they increasingly accumulated 
political and social rights and became what Hammar (1989) and others refer to as denizens. 
Over time the social status of Yugoslavian guest workers increasingly came to resemble that 
                                                
23 One woman we interviewed estimates that there are approximately 70 relief organisations in Germany related to Afghani-
stan. Members, including founding members, are both Afghans and Germans. This study focusses on the empirical investiga-
tion of associations that were initiated by Afghans and in which the majority of members are Afghans. 
24 According to extrapolations by Torsten Jäger and Reso Jasna (1999), only 5% of the civil war refugees in Germany from 
Bosnia are of Serbian descent. 
25 However, here, too, the number of refugees of Serbian descent may be very low. In this phase of the conflict, Germany 
accepted Kosovo Albanians as well as Sinti and Roma from Kosovo. Serbians from Kosovo, by contrast, were among the do-
mestically displaced, i.e. they mostly fled from Kosovo to Serbia (and not to other parts of Europe) (cp., for example, 
www2.amnesty.de/internet/deall.nsf/0/e233f4a8e296414dc1256aa00045d2d4?OpenDocument). 
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of German workers. Social advancement beyond that, however, has escaped the majority of 
them, in particular the Serbians. The educational situation of second generation migrants of 
Serbian origin demonstrates this. Although, the Serbians (including the Montenegrins) are 
among the largest of the migrant groups in Germany, a relatively low number of them study 
at German universities. They constitute only 3.5% of all the second generation immigrants 
educated in Germany, while such percentage levels are significantly higher for the other 
groups (Table 12). The second generation Serbians in Germany thus have tended to inherit 
the social status of their parents.   
Table 8: The Total Number of Yugoslavian Emigrants by Select Receiving Countries, 1961-1973 
Jahr Benelux Germany France Austria Sweden Switzerland Europe 
Total 
1961  17,500 200  1,900  30,000 
1962 6,700 36,400 500 1,000 2,400 1,100 50,000 
1963 9,800 42,900 2,000 2,700 2,600 2,000 90,000 
1964 12,000 48,800 3,900 5,500 3,700 5,500 115,000 
1965 12,000 68,700 6,600 13,200 7,600 8,500 140,000 
1966 11,000 90,500 10,000 25,700 13,100 10,000 210,000 
1967 10,000 84,800 32,800 37,500 14,000 11,000 220,000 
1968 9,000 148,400 40,800 35,600 14,800 12,500 300,000 
1969 14,500 297,000 52,100 40,100 17,700 21,000 420,000 
1970  415,500 62,700 56,100 22,600  550,000 
1971  434,900 69,900 128,800 22,900 34,000 660,000 
1972 15,000 465,600 77,200 166,200 24,000 40,000 760,000 
1973  535,000 86,200 195,500 25,800 32,000 860,000 
Source: Haberl, O, N, (1978) – Die Abwanderung von Arbeitskräften aus Jugoslawien, Zur Problematik ihrer Auslandsbeschäfti-
gung und Rückführung, Munich, R, Oldenbourg Verlag Munich, p. 276. 
The Yugoslavian labour migrants were primarily supported by the efforts of the Yugoslav-
ian state to maintain the immigrants’ loyalty to their country of origin. This occasioned the 
formation of their own associations. In the 1970s the Yugoslavian consulates initiated the 
establishment of “Yugoslavian clubs” in Germany. It was mainly welfare organisations such 
as the German AWO and the municipalities that contributed to the financial support of these 
clubs. In 1975 there were already 130 Yugoslavian clubs, each with approximately 150 
members (Haberl, 1978); and in 1980 there were 400 clubs (Brieden, 1996). With the col-
lapse of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, most of these clubs were disbanded; for the collapse of 
Yugoslavia was closely linked with the (re-)mobilisation of various forms of “nationalism”, 
which also affected the labour migrants. In particular, Serbians and Croatians rediscovered 
their national identities; and in a certain sense, a segment of the Serbian and Croatian popu-
lations living abroad became outposts for the national movements in their country of origin 
(Conversi, 2000 und Frykman, 2002). Correspondingly the earlier Yugoslavian clubs re-
formed themselves on a national or ethnic basis, and the 1990s witnessed a boom in Serbian 
clubs, which, like other national or ethnic groups from Yugoslavia, celebrated their newly 
discovered national pride and national identities. The Yugoslavian consulates supported this 
new “Diaspora nationalism”. By contrast, German organisations were reluctant to support 
Serbian associations. However, with the break in the diplomatic ties between Yugoslavia and 
17 
Germany in connection with the NATO intervention, the close relationships between the Ser-
bian clubs and the consulates were also broken off. These relationships were not reanimated 
after the renewal of diplomatic ties.26 
Table 9: Qualification Structure of the Yugoslavian Labour Force Recruited to the Federal 
Republic, 1969–1973 
Year Total  Lacking qualifica-
tions 
With qualifications 
absolute 67,745 55,526 12,226 1969 
% 100.0% 82.0% 18.0% 
absolute 106,495 77,203 29,292 1970 
% 100.0% 72.5% 27.5% 
absolute 73,492 51,389 22,103 1971 
% 100.0% 69.9% 30.1% 
absolute 47,815 30,613 17,202 1972 
% 100.0% 64.0% 36.0% 
absolute 67,111 42,663 24,448 1973 
% 100.0% 63.6% 36.4% 
Source: Haberl, O, N, (1978) - Die Abwanderung von Arbeitskräften aus Jugoslawien, Zur Problematik ihrer Auslandsbeschäfti-
gung und Rückführung, Munich, R, Oldenbourg Verlag Munich, p. 284 
Table 10: Residence Status of the Serbian Population, Stand 31 Dec. 2004 


























Temp. Perm.     
Yugoslavia 381,563 77,406 117,449 65,753 2,704 32,656 50,103 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
125,765 30,510 31,594 15,827 791 13,475 23,285 
Source: Ausländerzentralregister, Compiled by the BAMF 
In summary, the Yugoslavian guest workers were initially well-organised with the help of 
their country of origin. In the 1990s the network of Yugoslavian clubs was replaced with Ser-
bian associations. However, these have lost complete support from their country of origin 
since the end of the 1990s. As a result of this, many clubs have been disbanded. What is left 
are a range of sport, folklore and culture associations, whose continued existence is also 
threatened today. At present there is thus a quite low degree of organisation among the Ser-
bian workers in Germany.     
                                                
26 The political causes for this were certainly that the new government discontinued all the measures of the “Diaspora policy” 
after the deposition of Milosevic. In addition, the new political elite of Serbia, which saw itself as the democratic opposition, 
supposed that the Serbian clubs consisted of the conservative rural, who tended to be lacking in resources and to support the 
Milosevic regime.    
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2.3.2. Serbian Intellectuals and Student Immigrants: The Political Mobilisation of the 
Elite   
In the 1950s intellectuals from Serbia had already migrated to Germany. Many of them 
were supporters of the monarchy and critics of the communist regime. Later, Serbians con-
tinued to come to Germany to study, but in smaller numbers; and they have remained largely 
unseen. At present just under 1,000 Serbians register at German universities as foreign stu-
dents each year (Table 13). However, the percentage of immigrants from Serbia and Monte-
negro who are entering Germany for educational purposes is gradually increasing. In 2001 it 
was 4%; in 2004, a solid 5%. It is to be expected that the importance of student migration 
from Serbia will increase because student migration from the border states of the EU is being 
supported within the framework of the European educational policy, while the other forms of 
migration (familial related and political) are tapering off. 
Table 11: Immigration Data of Citizens of Serbia and Montenegro to Germany, 2000-2004 
Year Incoming Outgoing 
2000 33,015 89,269 
2001 28,349 35,989 
2002 25,501 36,303 
2003 21,442 27,958 
2004 20,366 25,679 
Source: German Federal Statistical Office, VI-B, Wanderungsstatistik 
Table 12: Students of Serbian Origin with Permanent Residence in Germany  in Comparison 
Country of Origin Absolute Number of Migrants (1) Percentage of all Students 
with Foreign Origin, but Per-
manent Residence Status (2) 
Turkey 1,764,318 29% 




Greece 315,989 6% 
Poland 292,109 4% 
Croatia 229,172 6% 
Source: (1) BAMF, 2004; (2) German Federal Statistical Office, 2004 
Table 13: Serbian and Montenegrin Students from Abroad and Those with Permanent 
Residence Status 
Year From Abroad With permanent resi-
dence status 
2001 1,116 2,454 
2002 1,108 2,345 
2003 1,104 2,206 
2004 1,097 2,155 
Source: wissenschaft-weltoffen, 2005 
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Some of the highly qualified Serbians who have lived in Germany for a long time have 
managed to become well-established. According to the Serbians we interviewed, many of 
them are medical doctors, teachers and engineers in Germany. Within the framework of the 
study, we were also able to establish contact with Serbian journalists, university employees 
and interpreters. In addition, a number of middle-sized entrepreneurs are among these highly 
qualified migrants. 
In connection with the Serbian-Croatian conflict at the beginning of the 1990s, in Ger-
many highly qualified Serbians were also involved in activities related to national issues.  
Like the Serbian guest workers, they organised Serbian cultural clubs, but in contrast to the 
Serbian guest workers, these operated largely autonomously. They primarily concentrated on 
the political and social development in Yugoslavia, although some of these associations had 
strong contacts to the Serbian orthodox church in Germany and contributed to establishing 
new church communities in Germany.27 After the introduction of party pluralism, unofficial 
party offices of nearly all the newly established political parties from the remnants of Yugo-
slavia were established in Germany. Most of these were called into existence by highly quali-
fied Serbians and students. With the Kosovo conflict at the end of the 1990s, the political 
mobilisation of the highly qualified Serbians reached its highpoint. Their organisations ac-
tively protested the NATO deployment in Serbia, organised public appearances against what 
they perceived to be a skewed media presentation of the situation in Yugoslavia, cam-
paigned for aid initiatives for Serbia and came forward for or against Milosevic. With the end 
of the war and the calming of the domestic political situation, the activities of the associations 
also lost their mobilising élan.   
While the number of highly qualified immigrants and student immigrants from Serbia is 
low, they can be strongly mobilised. However, their activities were exclusively directed to-
wards the conflict-laden political situation of their country of origin, and with the normalisation 
of relations in Serbia, they lost power and intensity. 
                                                
27 Far more than 250,000 believing Serbians now live in Germany, organised in diverse communities. The Serbian Orthodox 
Church in Germany is subject to Episcopal Orthodox theology and Orthodox Church law. It forms a diocese with a bishop at the 
head and has 29 large communities and 36 sanctuaries for church services in Germany. At present 16 churches belong to the 
Serbian Orthodox Church. These are in various cities, including Düsseldorf, Osnabrück, Munich, Hanover, Berlin, Dortmund, 
Stuttgart, Ulm (www.kokid.de/bistuemer/sok.htm). 
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3. Diaspora Activities and Their Significance for Developmental 
Policy  
3.1. Economic Activities of the Diaspora 
3.1.1. Remittances 
Over the past few years, attention has increasingly been paid to immigrants’ remittances 
to their countries of origin, because in many countries they constitute a considerable share of 
the gross domestic product (GDP); they contribute to the balance of payments; and in many 
cases they surpass the amount of official inflows in these countries (see The World Bank, 
2005; Straubhaar and Vadean, 2006). But a more detailed look is needed, since there is a 
gap in the empirical knowledge of remittances, the conditions under which they are made 
and their respective utilisation.    
a) Missing data 
There are numerous reasons for the incomplete data on the remittance flows from Ger-
many to Afghanistan, Egypt and Serbia. In Afghanistan and Serbia the statistical collections 
are very meagre. In Egypt the methods of data collection employed differ significantly from 
those employed in Germany.   
 For Afghanistan neither national offices nor international finance organisations record 
remittance inflows. According to the unpublished statistics of the German Federal Bank, €22 
million in workers’ remittances were made from Germany to Afghanistan in 2004. However, 
these statistics only record official cash transfers of unnaturalised (i.e. foreign-national) Af-
ghans in Germany.  
The remittance flows back to Serbia are not recorded by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), and the Serbian Central Bank only documents running public and private transfers in 
aggregate, without distinguishing these according to the source country.28 According to un-
published statistics of the German Federal Bank, €240 million were transferred from Ger-
many to Serbia in 2004. Here, too, however, only official cash transfers of unnaturalised (i.e. 
foreign-national) Serbians living in Germany are recorded.   
The statistical databases for Egypt are much better, but the information of the Egyptian 
Central Bank differs from that of the German Federal Bank. According to the Egyptian Cen-
tral Bank, the inflow of workers’ remittances from Germany in 2004 amounted to US$90 mil-
lion  (cp. Fargues, 2005). According to unpublished statistics of the German Federal Bank, 
however, workers’ remittances amounted only to €4 million. This considerable difference in 
the statistical data results from the different methods for estimating the remittance flow. The 
Egyptian Central Bank very broadly interprets all transfers from private individuals abroad 
received by private individuals in Egypt as workers’ remittances, although such transfers may 
also be from foreigners. By contrast, the German Federal Bank only views cash transfers as 
remittances, and it aligns this data by means of extrapolation on the basis of statistics of the 
German Federal Employment Agency [Bundesagentur für Arbeit] on the employment and 
                                                
28 The largest share of the remittances are included in the balance of payment statistics under the category “Workers’ Remit-
tances” (under Current Transfers). According to the specifications of the IMF, further categories in which remittances are 
booked are ”Compensation of Employees” (under Income) and “Migrants’ Transfers” (under Capital Transfers) (for more on 
remittances in the balance of payment statistics, see Straubhaar and Vadean, 2006). 
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unemployment of foreigners. This, however, results in a strong underestimation, because 
neither foreigners who have entered into employment without the full social insurance bene-
fits nor those members of the Diaspora who were naturalised in Germany are included in the 
statistics.29 
A further explanation for this great discrepancy in the numbers is that the Egyptian Cen-
tral Bank probably includes “Compensations of Employees” and “Migrants’ Transfers” in their 
estimation of the remittance flows. Furthermore, it is possible that certain transfers are 
booked by the central banks under different categories. Such private transfers may be 
booked, for example, as remittances by the Egyptian Central Bank and as direct investments 
by the German Federal Bank. 
b) The importance of the length of residence 
One hypothesis about the way the households behave in regard to remittances presumes 
that, in the process of assimilation in the receiving country, the intensity of the relationship to 
the region of origin in general, and to the relatives who remain there in particular, decreases, 
and that the remittances to the country of origin decrease accordingly (Lucas; Stark, 1985 
and Glytsos, 1997). However, among those we questioned, the financial support for family 
members remained relatively constant over a long time span. Remittances to purchase prop-
erty or as productive investments also appear to be typical for migrants with long-term and 
stable residence status in Germany. These migrants were able to save more money over 
time, and they thus had a stronger investment potential. The hypothesis that an increase in 
assimilation results in a decrease in remittances to the country of origin therefore could not 
be confirmed for the three Diaspora communities we studied.      
c) The importance of the official finance system 
The economic theory presumes that the weaker the official case studies system is or the 
more threatened the country of origin is by political, institutional or macro-economic instability 
(e.g. war, bank bankruptcies, inflation), the greater the use of informal transfer channels. Our 
case studies confirm this. On the basis of the poor infrastructure of the finance sector, most 
of the transfers flow to Afghanistan through the informal Hawala system,  according to the 
information of the IMF, 80%-90% of them. Serbia has a well-developed banking system, yet 
the Serbian population in Germany does not trust this system because the Serbian govern-
ment nationalised their currency accounts in the 1990s in order to finance the war. Further-
more, the fraudulent pyramid systems30 as well as hyperinflation have resulted in further un-
certainty. Even though the Serbian finance market is now more stable, there are stronger 
guarantees and attractive interest rates (e.g. 4%-6% for fixed deposits in euro), and many 
West European banks have opened branch offices, it is estimated that approximately one-
third of the remittances flow through informal channels (Jelasic, 2004). By contrast, Egypt 
registers the highest share of remittance inflows through official channels, an estimated 50%-
                                                
29 In the German statistics, as in those of other countries of Continental Europe, differentiations are made according to coun-
try of citizenship. In Anglo-Saxon countries one differentiates according to country of birth.   
30 A pyramid system (also known as a snowball system) is, in a broader sense, a social process, in which those who partici-
pate early on reap the advantages and those who participate late reap the disadvantages. In the case of monetary investments, 
participants are enticed by the high interest rates. The high interest rates are financed by the investments of later investors. The 
system collapses if too few new participants join, and as a consequence, the investments, including interest, can no longer be 
paid at the end of the respective terms. The later the participants join in this type of system, the sooner they loose their invested 
money.  
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70%.31 This is due to the relatively well-developed banking system and the relative macro-
economic and political stability in recent decades (the latter which can hardly be considered 
certain in the future).   
d) The cost of transfers 
Transfer costs also play an important role in the choice of the remittance channels. The 
informal Hawala is used by most Afghans because the transfer is considered safe, and it only 
costs 1%-2% of the transferred amount. A formal Hawala is presently being established in 
Germany. With fees of 3%-5% of the transferred amount, it is more expensive than the in-
formal Hawala, but it is competitive with the transfer services offered by banks and cheaper 
than Western Union. Furthermore, it offers better service, transferring the money directly to 
the receiver’s address. Among Egyptians, non-cash transfers appear to be common. The 
costs of the bank remittances are comparatively low, at 3%-4%. Nevertheless, according to 
those we interviewed, in order to save the transfer costs, there are many cash transports.  
By contrast, among Serbians it is much more common to transfer money through bus and 
travel companies. At 8%-10%, the costs are much higher than bank remittances (3%-4%) or 
remittances with Western Union (7%). Yet, the mistrust of financial institutes, which resulted 
from the experiences in the 1990s, appears to have remained, and to be decisive for the 
choice of the mode of monetary transfers.  
e) The amount of the remittances and their uses  
The use of the remitted funds depends on the economic situation of the migrants, those 
who receive the money, as well as the political and macro-economic situation in the country 
of origin. For example, the majority of the population in Afghanistan lives under the poverty 
line (53%) (CIA, 2005), and many families, in particular among the rural population, are de-
pendent on remittances (The World Bank, 2004). Afghans in Germany do not possess great 
financial potential. As a consequence, according to the information of our interview partners, 
Afghan migrants regularly transfer smaller amounts (approximately €200 per month), which 
largely serve as a means of subsistence for the recipients. 
On the basis of the size of the Serbian Diaspora in Germany, it possesses greater finan-
cial potential than the Afghan Diaspora. Because Serbia, with a per capita GDP of US$2,700, 
is among the world’s middle income countries (CIA, 2005), we presume that the means of 
subsistence of those living there does not depend as much on the transferred funds as in 
Afghanistan. As a consequence, the use of the transferred funds in Serbia differs from that in 
Afghanistan. According to our interview partners, Serbians transfer on average about €5,000 
per year, the majority of which goes into the construction or renovation of houses or pur-
chase of real estate. They view investments in real estate as lucrative, and both less compli-
cated and safer than business investments.  
Egypt is also among the group of countries in the middle income bracket (per capita 
GDP, US$4,400). In comparison to Serbia, however, in recent decades it has enjoyed rela-
tive political and macro-economic stability. In addition, many members of the Egyptian Dias-
pora in Germany are from Egypt’s affluent elite. It is thus not surprising that the majority of 
their remittances to Egypt is invested, among other things, in real estate, industries, service 
                                                
31 The estimated share differs in the various studies (cp. Carling, 2005 and ECORYS, 2005). 
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branches, education (for more on this, see Section 3.1.2). Many Egyptian immigrants also 
individually support Islamic organisations through voluntary contributions known as Zaqqat 
and Sadaqqa;32 most of this is for the construction or maintenance of schools and mosques 
in their hometowns (ECORYS, 2005). 
To conclude, remittances seem to play an important role in alleviating poverty in poor 
countries. In middle income countries, through an increased demand for real estate, they 
contribute to the development of the construction sector. If the Diaspora possesses the ade-
quate financial potential and confidence in the macro-economic framework, then remittances 
to the country of origin increasingly flow into investments and the development of the infra-
structure.  
f) Macro-economic importance 
From a macro-economic perspective, remittances have played a positive and important 
role in the countries of origin included in our study. They have contributed to covering a con-
siderable portion of the trade deficit. In Egypt they have even resulted in a surplus in the bal-
ance of payments. In general it is estimated that the substantial inflow of remittances has 
contributed to the stability of the exchange rates in all three countries.  
3.1.2. Direct Investments 
a) Different types of involvement 
The Serbian, Afghan and Egyptian migrants we investigated play an important role in the 
economic structural development of their countries of origin in various ways. This is under-
lined, for example, by the data of the Afghanistan Investment Support Agency (AISA),33 
which claims that 28% of the investment in Afghanistan is from the Afghan Diaspora. How-
ever, three forms of migrant engagement in direct investment processes are to be differenti-
ated.   
Well-educated migrants with less capital contribute to the economic structural develop-
ment of their countries of origin by using their involvement there as a chance for career ad-
vancement within the framework of companies’ transnationalisation processes. These types 
of migrants, for example, might have years of work experience with a German company, and 
within the framework of this work, convince the company management that it would be profit-
able to carry out business operations in their country of origin. They clarify the conditions for 
suitable investment possibilities, play an active role in bringing about these investments and 
take on management positions in the newly founded daughter companies after the invest-
ments have been made. We primarily found cases of this sort among the Afghans and Serbi-
ans.  
Other migrants play an important role in the implementation of direct investments in their 
countries of origin by exploiting their good contacts to their home country governments, and 
playing a mediating role. So, for example, one Serbian who earlier worked as an economic 
                                                
32 According to the Koran, 2%-5% of one’s income should be donated to the poor or an Islamic charity. This contribution is to 
be paid annually as a Zaggat. Sadaqqa is money that is voluntarily donated for such purposes.   
33 The Afghanistan Investment Support Agency (AISA) was established in 2003 by the Afghan government – and the GTZ 
served as a consultant – in order to offer information about investment possibilities in Afghanistan and to offer various services 
for investors, e.g. consulting for local bank and credit systems and possible relief programs, as well as support in establishing 
enterprises and help in acquiring licenses (www.aisa.org.af). 
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attaché in the Serbian consulate was employed by a German consulting firm. Using his good 
contacts to the Serbian government, he was able to serve as a consultant for German com-
panies with direct investment plans in Serbia. Another example is an Afghan who played a 
role in the development of a mineral water plant in Kabul. Through an acquaintance who was 
employed by the Afghan government, he was brought into contact with an Afghan investment 
group for which he took on the responsibility of organising the purchase of machines in Ger-
many, having them transported to Afghanistan and  having them installed and implemented 
there. He also arranged the servicing of the machines and functioned as a business and 
technical consultant for the newly established company.   
By contrast, migrants with sufficient financial resources act as investors on their own 
right. As expected, this was found most frequently among the Egyptians. So, for example, a 
German businessman of Egyptian origin employed approximately 1,000 Egyptians in an auto 
accessories plant. In addition, he owns a hydraulic plant, which trains its employees in Ger-
many. Another Egyptian businessman with residence in Germany made profits with shares in 
a paper factory in Egypt. In addition, he founded a trade company, which primarily was in-
volved in distributing machines, as well as special stones for high temperature ovens and 
steel for German companies. Finally, he invested in the tourist branch. An Egyptian doctor 
who completed his specialist training in medicine in Germany and had a parallel practice in 
Germany also opened an orthopaedic practice in Cairo in which patients are examined by 
German medical doctors via telemedicine. Two further examples of successful investments 
are taken from the Egyptian education system. One highly qualified Egyptian who was edu-
cated in Germany opened a private German school in Cairo. Another, who had completed 
the post-doctoral habilitation in Germany, founded a private German university in Cairo.    
b) Comparative advantages of the migrants 
The entrepreneurs we questioned, in particular those from Egypt, view themselves as 
having an advantage over both Egyptian entrepreneurs without migration experience and 
middle-sized foreign investors. Through their studies in Germany and multiple years of work 
at German universities or with companies, they have acquired professional expertise and 
contacts that their competitors there lack. In addition, some of them have political contacts at 
various levels in Germany, and they are able to mobilise these contacts to promote particular 
investment projects (the case of the German University in Cairo is one example).  
Central resources of the entrepreneurial migrants that result from their migration are their 
relative affluence and strong inner-ethnic networking and organisation. The contacts that 
they have made and fostered are not limited to Germany. Starting with the acquaintances in 
their Diaspora, important contacts have been expanded to and developed in their respective 
countries of origin. In the case of Egypt, two conditions were especially responsible for this: 
The economic and political culture there is characterised by clientelism, and, correspond-
ingly, the right connections often set the tone for entrepreneurial success. A number of the 
highly qualified Egyptians are from families connected in important clientelist political and 
economic networks.  
Correspondingly, family loyalty is of great importance. Among nearly all entrepreneurial 
Egyptians that we interviewed, members of the extended family were active in founding or 
directing the company. In some cases, they made financial capital available; in others, they 





The described advantages of entrepreneurs who do in fact become involved in ventures 
in their country of origin also indicate the context that prevents many migrants from becoming 
involved in enterprises there. Many of them decide not to get involved in business in their 
country of origin, although they have all the prerequisites, because numerous obstacles also 
stand in their way.   
Many of them view the strong divergence between their professional socialisation in 
Germany and the business culture in their countries of origin as an obstacle. Migrants from 
all three case studies who regularly visit relatives in their countries of origin or take holidays 
there complained about corruption and the lack of reliability of the business people there. For 
many migrants rooted in Germany, this is a decisive reason not to invest there. For potential 
investors among the migrants, the business culture, which has become foreign to them, is 
also a barrier if they view their cultural background as a comparative advantage per se and 
thus overestimate it.   
The fact that affluent migrants, on the whole, rarely make economic investments in their 
country of origin is also to be explained by the fact that direct-investment success requires 
special effort.  Among other things, it calls for making the country of origin a long-term or 
even permanent focal point in one’s life. Given family ties and already existing business or 
professional responsibilities in the immigration country, this is not always possible. 
In addition, direct investments require a lot of capital – among other things, the capacity 
to accept losses and financially bridge them for a certain amount of time if necessary. Ac-
cording to our interview partners, the still insecure political and legal frameworks (in Afghani-
stan, Serbia), along with the poorly functioning litigation (in Afghanistan, Egypt and Serbia), 
are considerable obstacles, as there is the difficulty of successfully collecting outstanding 
debt from unpaid bills. In a country such as Afghanistan, further material obstacles are the 
lack of an infrastructure (in particular, electricity) and the difficultly of gaining access to land, 
properly skilled labour and financial services (The World Bank, 2005). 
3.1.3. Foreign Trade 
a) Personal business contacts 
In all of our case studies, migrants contributed to the maintenance and development of 
trade relationships with their countries of origin. Here, individuals from the three migrant 
groups assumed mediating roles. Individual business relationships and personal contacts in 
the country of origin are among the most important factors for reducing transaction costs. 
This confirms the theory that the network connections of small ethnic groups (as among Af-
ghans, Egyptians and Serbians in Germany) incur lower transaction costs.34 
                                                
34 Larger ethnic communities (relative to the population of the receiving country) that have many transnational connections 
tend to make information about the markets available, whereby, Diaspora members serve as intermediaries (Rauch and Trin-
dade, 2002). In this case, transaction costs only sink if the migrant groups are from a country whose social and political institu-
tions vary sharply from those of the receiving country (cp. Münz, 2006). 
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Thus, the settlement of carpet traders in Hamburg, which stored their goods in the free-
harbour and founded branch offices, was one of the most important reasons that Afghans 
later also chose to immigrate there. The strong presence of Afghans in Hamburg then re-
sulted in the further development and expansion of the carpet trade with Afghanistan (and in 
general with countries of the Near East). The harbour became one of the most important 
entrepot sites for carpets worldwide. Half (of approximately 300) of the carpet trade compa-
nies in Hamburg are owned by businessmen of Afghan origin, at least according to the sub-
jective assessment of one interview partner.     
In the case of the Serbian Diaspora, for example, one member of the Serbian association 
served as a consultant for synthetic material producers on the German labour market. In ad-
dition, he mediated contacts between Serbian forest enterprises and German wood process-
ing companies. Another member of the Serbian Diaspora, who works for Audi, prompted the 
production of a catalogue of Serbian car products. There is a solid demand for the catalogue 
from the automobile industry as well as individual car dealerships in Germany.   
b) Challenges 
In particular in the cases of Egypt and Serbia, those interviewed pointed out that the 
problem of observing quality specifications (such as, for example, packing requirements) and 
the lack of production standards were severe obstacles to expanding exports to Germany 
and the European Union.35 
In Egypt many companies lack clear production standards, and quality control procedures 
are deficient. Precisely this made it possible for one of our interview partners to establish an 
intermediary company for cumin oil. Because the quality of the oil is not possible to be relia-
bly checked in Egypt, few importers from Europe risked importing the goods directly from 
Egypt. The Egyptian businessman therefore imported the raw materials to Germany and had 
them processed into oil there. Given the lacking standards in Egypt, he could not rely upon 
the oil producers there, since the quality varies greatly with production. The establishment of 
independent monitoring sites or laboratories in Egypt is key to providing Egyptian employees 
with discipline and forcing them to provide consistent quality. However, given the lack of in-
formation and experience, it is very difficult for producers to provide such quality; so there is 
a danger that they will loose access to the European market. The Serbians are familiar with 
similar problems, and the objective of one project carried out by the GTZ to promote the Ser-
bian export industry was to inform Serbian producers of EU-compatible product standards 
and advise them of ways to achieve these standards.   
However, increasing the quality and production standards is not merely a problem con-
cerning exports. If the domestic production does not achieve the demanded (and elsewhere 
supplied) quality, remittances increasingly flow into imports. Then the demand, which has 
increased due to remittances to the country of origin, no longer contributes to the develop-
ment of domestic production capacities; correspondingly, the developmental chances poten-
tially connected to this are lost. 
 
 
                                                
35 This problem has probably not yet arisen in Afghanistan, because the domestic production cannot even satisfy the domes-
tic demand. With the development of production capacities, it will also become important.   
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3.2. Activities Related to Infrastructure Development 
The previous section dealt with the activities of migrants related to their countries of ori-
gin, mainly from an economic perspective. There we focussed on money flows, monetary 
applications and the uses of business or professional competencies, and we inquired into 
their effects on trade balances, the structure of demand and investment, the development of 
industry and trade and the establishment of product standards. However, migrants are not 
primarily engaged in their countries of origin through economic activities, even if these activi-
ties have considerable economic consequences. For example, first of all, monetary transfers 
serve the reproduction of the family; and this spending, for its part, can have economic ef-
fects. Through individual actions or organisational activities, migrants also contribute to 
(re-)developing or maintaining the social infrastructure, related to issues of education, health-
care, science or other public goods provision. In each case, this is a matter of creating or 
maintaining the structural conditions in the mentioned areas, which undoubtedly initially re-
quire investment, and whose failure to function considerably limits the functionality of mar-
kets. In what follows, we look into the contributions of Afghans, Egyptians and Serbians to 
the development of the infrastructures in their respective countries. Within this framework, we 
investigate whether individual or collective activities are at issue. Here, we also attend to the 
scope of the activity, its duration and the respective motivation for it.   
3.2.1. Egypt 
It is mostly highly qualified migrants who contribute to the development of the infrastruc-
ture in Egypt. Nearly all the projects that we are familiar with were the responsibility of indi-
vidual migrants. Few were collective projects – projects of migrant organisations or other 
migrant affiliations. Here we will list some examples of the individual and collective infrastruc-
ture projects of the highly qualified Egyptian migrants. 
a) Individual infrastructure projects 
Healthcare sector: The activities of one doctor are exemplary here. He studied medicine 
in Egypt and went to Germany in the 1980s to complete a specialist training. After some 
years of working in a hospital, he founded his own medical practice, which thrived. In the 
1990s he began to work on the idea of founding a practice in Egypt, and after some years, it 
was opened. Since then he has commuted back and forth between the German and the 
Egyptian practices in bi-weekly rhythms. 
Education: While the German University in Cairo is considered one of the successful pro-
jects of the Egyptian Diaspora in their homeland, there is in fact no collective actor behind 
the project, but a single individual. The university founder completed his doctoral education 
and wrote his post-doctoral habilitation in Germany, but returned to Egypt upon completion. 
There he followed up the idea of doing independent academic work. First, he inquired into 
the possibility of founding an institute, which, however, was not able to be established in its 
originally envisaged form. So he decided to use his existing contacts to Germany, and he 
intensified his contacts to his former host university and to political bodies in Germany. The 
German host university offered to serve as the official sponsoring university for the German 
University in Cairo. The political contacts of the university founder were even strong enough 
that, together with a delegation and members of Egyptian associations, the German Chan-
cellor at the time, Gerhard Schröder, participated in the opening of the university. After this 
successful symbolic prelude, the German University in Cairo was able to gain the support of 
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six further German organisations. The university is a private facility. Some of our interview 
partners reported that the university founder invested his entire family assets in the univer-
sity. It is a for-profit institution, aimed especially at the Egyptian upper middle class. Less 
affluent Egyptian families thus have no access to this university.    
A less known, but similar, project is the German School in Egypt. The founder of this 
school was active in business in Egypt for a number of years. He is co-owner of a processing 
plant in Egypt and a German-Egyptian trade company. He also has holdings in other smaller 
investment projects. On the basis of his steady business success, he began long-term in-
vestments in education. He opened a private German school in Cairo. The school is bilin-
gual, and structured in accord with the predominant didactic teaching principles in Germany. 
It aspires to co-operative work with a secondary school in Germany. The school competes 
with two other established German schools in Cairo and attempts to allure middle class 
Egyptian families with low prices. 
Besides the establishment of such for-profit educational and scientific facilities, Egyptian 
migrants are also involved in more idealistic efforts that aim to mediate the exchange of sci-
ence and scientists as well as professional know-how.   
Scientific exchange and knowledge procurement: Some Egyptian migrants who have had 
long-term employment in German higher education have made efforts to facilitate the ex-
change of students and knowledge between Egypt and Germany. In particular, professors of 
Egyptian origin in Germany have made short stays and/or further academic qualification pos-
sible for Egyptian students at German universities. Academic experts in history and the cul-
tural sciences have invited Egyptian colleagues to give lectures or other presentations of 
their work. According to our interview partners, some university lecturers of Egyptian origin 
also offer gratis seminars and presentations in Egypt. The efforts to facilitate the exchange of 
knowledge do not only take place at universities; they can also be found among other Egyp-
tian professionals. For example, one Egyptian doctor practicing in Germany organised a 
medical congress in Egypt. Another specialist has carried out seminars on specific therapeu-
tic methods not yet known in the area where the seminars were offered. One person involved 
in the German-Egyptian cultural exchange worked in support of the newly built library in Al-
exandria. Two engineers who did their doctoral studies in Germany founded an institute for 
the study of solar energy in Egypt. They aspire to work in collaboration with German scien-
tists.      
Welfare: An Egyptian political scientist who serves as the director of a social information 
centre at a German welfare organisation founded an association that organises various 
forms of support for members form the Copt underclass in Egypt. Apart from its founder, the 
association consists mostly of Germans. It carries out a few smaller projects for Copt gar-
bage men in Cairo and is dedicated to further projects for women and girls. Besides that, it 
supports a Coptic school in Egypt and carries out  educational and work projects in a region 
strongly affected by migration. As the founder of the association and its main activist, the 
Egyptian social worker was decisive for the association’s focus on Egypt and especially on 
the Copt minority. However, he had difficulties finding an association partner from the Dias-
pora. Solely the Coptic church in Germany symbolically supports him; but it does not count 
this initiative among its own projects, and it provides neither personnel nor financial assis-
tance to the association. However, the local priest of the Coptic church is a formal member, 
and he provides personal support, for example, accompanying the association during student 
trips through Egypt.     
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b) Collective infrastructure projects  
According to our information, the number of infrastructure projects of organisations of 
Egyptian migrants in Germany appears to be rather small. The Egyptian Businessmen’s As-
sembly [Verband der ägyptischen Unternehmer], together with the Egyptian House (the two 
most important organisations representing Egyptian professionals in Germany), supports the 
development of a children’s cancer clinic in Egypt. In total, €20,000 was collected for the 
clinic, and expertise was provided for planning and carrying out the project. The objective of 
a further project was to construct a kindergarten in an Egyptian city. This project was carried 
out by the oldest Egyptian association in Germany, which is also a member of the German 
Egyptian House. The association managed to gain the support of other Egyptian organisa-
tions in Germany for the project, and thereby to acquire money from them. 
3.2.2. Afghanistan 
The empirical data indicates the existence of numerous infrastructure projects from mi-
grant organisations. These projects and the commitment to the infrastructure that sustains 
them are to be viewed against the background of the political circumstances in Afghanistan. 
The (still) weak Afghan state is not in a position to provide advance legal and political con-
cessions that the aid organisations can rely upon; as a result, these organisations must as-
sume a great deal of risk, and they are confronted with problems such as corruption. 
Through over two decades of war, the infrastructure in all areas has been largely destroyed, 
and the Diaspora organisations fulfil tasks originally carried out by the government. They 
consequently are substituting for the state by assisting in creating the infrastructure.       
To carry out infrastructure projects, Afghan migrants in Germany have consolidated (e.g. 
in professional clubs, women’s and students’ associations, diverse aid organisations, founda-
tions). The first organisations were established at the end of the 1970s, when the Soviet in-
vasion resulted in a flood of refugees from Afghanistan. At the beginning of the 1990s, pro-
grams of German developmental co-operation supported the establishment of further NGOs 
of Afghan migrants in Germany. For example, the GTZ implemented a skilled-labour program 
with the goal of helping integrate Afghan migrants in Germany into the reconstruction and 
developmental efforts in their country of origin after the end of the communist regime. How-
ever, because of deteriorating political conditions in Afghanistan after 1992 (the outbreak of 
the civil war), the project’s objective – the integration of Afghan skilled labourers – was called 
into question. The skilled-labourers program was transformed into an immediate action and 
emergency assistance program for returning refugees from Pakistan and Iran: Here Afghan 
migrants took on advisory functions or assumed developmental tasks on their own initiative. 
In the framework of the skilled-labourer program, further-education seminars were conducted 
and various specialist groups were established (in agriculture, healthcare, construction, resi-
dential planning, energy and industry, vocational education, elementary education and 
women’s advancement). On the basis of the specialist group work, some independent struc-
tures developed, leading to the establishment of associations.36 After the political changes in 
Afghanistan in 2001, numerous further NGOs were established (not only Afghan migrant 
organisations), which are active in diverse infrastructure projects in the country. 
                                                
36 For example, the Association of Engineers and Technicians in Germany [Verein afghanischer Ingenieure und Techniker in 
Deutschland ] (VAIT e.V.), the Association for the Agricultural and Technical Development of Afghanistan [Gesellschaft für 
landwirtschaftliche und technische Entwicklung Afghanistans] (GltEA), the Afghan Women’s Association [Afghanische Frauen-
verein] (AFV e.V.), the Afghan Aid and Development Service [Afghanische Hilfs- und Entwicklungsdienst ] (AHED) (cp. GTZ 
Schlussbericht, 1995: Fachkräfteprogramm Afghanistan). 
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Afghan migrants are active in serving the public good in Afghanistan both as association 
members and as individuals. Here, however, these two forms of action have not been ana-
lysed separately because the majority of projects are carried out collectively. Their strong 
interest in the reconstruction of the country results from the fact that they were affected by 
the social catastrophe either directly or indirectly, through relationships with their families. 
According to our empirical data, most individual activity consists in the donation of materials, 
for example, school materials. An exceptional number of projects of Afghan Diaspora organi-
sations are concerned with providing for the healthcare and education infrastructure. In addi-
tion, the data identifies projects that serve the development of social welfare, the emancipa-
tion of girls and women and the provision of energy.     
Healthcare: Because of the lack of qualified medical personnel, the level of healthcare in 
Afghanistan is very low. The work of the organisations we questioned thus serves to provide 
the necessary infrastructure. They may provide the materials to build or renovate clinics, for 
example, to equip them with operating rooms and air conditioners, guarantee the supply of 
water or to set up (mobile) outpatient clinics. One example is an association of medical doc-
tors, which has supported a gynaecological and paediatric clinic in Jalalabad since 1999; 
here, free gynaecological and paediatric examinations are carried out. The association cov-
ers the salaries of the personnel and the costs of renting the building. Furthermore, with the 
help of donations, a dentistry clinic that a Diaspora Afghan earlier ran was able to be rede-
veloped. In collaboration with an Italian NGO, DAMF e.V. built a healthcare centre for refu-
gees in Chewa. DAMF e.V. is also planning to establish a university hospital in Mazar-e 
Sharif. 
An attempt is being made to redress the lack of medical equipment, medicine and nursing 
resources (beds, wheelchairs) in Afghanistan by transporting these items from Germany 
(these are donated, for example, by hospitals, doctors and pharmaceutical companies) (cp. 
Medicina Afghanica, 9/2003). Acting as “capacity builders”, individual members of doctors’ 
associations – in particular under the co-ordination of DAMF e.V. – are active. They provide 
the personnel infrastructure needed to educate and train colleagues in Afghanistan. By doing 
so, they promote various specialisations in the Diaspora medical training in diverse areas 
(e.g. in the diverse areas of dentistry, pediatric medicine or cardiology). Besides providing 
training courses in Afghanistan, DAMF e.V. offers individual fellowships for doctors from Af-
ghanistan. They are able to audit courses in particular departments of German clinics, de-
pending on their specialisation. Afghan doctors living in Germany use their contacts to hospi-
tals or other medical facilities to procure placement.  
Education: As in the area of healthcare, it is also necessary to create the infrastructure 
preconditions necessary for education.37 Since 2001 numerous school buildings have been 
newly constructed, and many young boys and girls have been provided with schooling.38 
However, the lack of a qualified teaching personnel is also a major problem. Activities of the 
Diaspora organisations include the new building and rebuilding of schools, redevelopment, 
the construction of toilets and deep wells, the supplying of school furniture. For example, in 
Kunduz the the Afghan Women’s Association [Afghanische Frauenverein] (AFVe.V.) built a school building in 
which girls can be given lessons in the morning and boys, in the afternoon. In the province of 
                                                
37 The illiteracy rates in Afghanistan are among the highest in the world. Under the communist regime, there were at least 
educational offers in the cities. With the outbreak of the civil war in the 1990s, the educational system increasingly collapsed, 
and under the Taliban in particular it was not possible for girls to attend school.   
38 The number of new people being schooled is estimated at about 3 million (National Human Development Report, 2004).  
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Wardak, the Association for the Agricultural and Technical Development of Afghanistan [Ge-
sellschaft für landwirtschaftliche und technische Entwicklung Afghanistans] (GltEA) built a 
school that had been destroyed in the war. In the secondary school, students can be taught 
from grades one to twelve; there they can be prepared for university. With the financial assis-
tance of other organisations, the Afghan Communication and Cultural Centre [afghanischen 
Kommunikations- und Kulturzentrum] in Berlin and the Association Scheherazad [Verein 
Scheherazade e.V.] established a school in the province of Nimroz. Because of the liberal 
province government, coeducational lessons can be offered at this elementary school.   
 Beyond providing the constructional infrastructure, some organisations guarantee the 
ongoing operation of schools, for example, by hiring teachers and other personnel and pay-
ing their salaries. In addition, they provide teaching materials, as well as uniforms for the 
students. Besides the ongoing support for schools, there are special donations, for example, 
for children’s school books and pencils, in which the products are bought on site or in Paki-
stan. A further objective of the organisation is to qualify the teaching personnel.39 
Social welfare: The projects aiming at social welfare serve to substitute for the families 
destroyed in the war. The Afghan migrant organisations especially focus on assisting or-
phans, widows and children injured in the war. For example, one association has built a 
house for widows and orphans in Kabul in which widows live with their own children and one 
or more orphans in respectively self-contained housing units. In the “peace houses” of an-
other NGO, young boys and girls with war injuries are looked after. Besides these concrete 
projects, interview partners also talked about project ideas, for example, a facility for the 
handicapped or a house for divorced women.  
The emancipation of girls and women: Given the poor – or intermittent virtual lack of – ex-
isting possibilities for girls’ education, some organisations focus on compensating for this 
long-term discrimination by building and supervising special girls schools, since co-
educational schools will not be tolerated in large parts of Afghanistan. For adult women, for 
example, the AFV e.V. pays for educational centres in which women can learn the  tailoring 
or knitting profession and simultaneously take part in courses on reading and writing, and on 
hygiene and nutrition. The training, along with the receipt of a sewing machine, ought to open 
the possibility for gainful employment. Our interview partners viewed the improvements of 
women’s education and further-education possibilities for them as the most effective way to 
ameliorate their position in society. 
Energy sector: Members of VAIT e.V.  in Germany are involved with the development of 
the energy sector in their homeland; in this, they focus primarily on regenerative energy. One 
member of VAIT e.V. developed a solar lamp, which is meant to replace the health-damaging 
oil lamps. Attempts are especially being made to support development in rural areas be-
cause the international aid thus far has almost exclusively been concentrated in Kabul. One 
association has built a model village in the province of Wardak on the basis of regenerative 
energy. Simple equipment generated with solar energy alleviates the work of women when 
they are washing, baking or beating milk in butter production. To obtain energy, the village 
has built stations consisting of a combination of solar modules and windmills. 
                                                
39 According to one woman we interviewed, various NGOs that are active in the educational sector in Afghanistan have 
formed a working group to consult on the possibilities for providing Afghan teachers with qualifications. The new curriculum 
drawn up by the Ministry of Education requires that they be trained. Numerous associations in Germany are involved in the area 




The commitment among Serbian migrants to developing the infrastructure is now on the 
verge of disappearing. Beyond the efforts of isolated individuals to promote the exchange of 
science and knowledge between Germany and Serbia, there are neither individual nor collec-
tive infrastructure projects. On the whole, today the Serbians appear to be more concerned 
with the possibilities for generating the public and political representation of their interests in 
Germany. For example, the creation of a Serbian umbrella organisation is planned, which is 
primarily aimed at representing the interests of Serbians in Germany. Many Serbian associa-
tions lack resources. They are thus concerned with securing their own survival. Relationships 
of various Serbian organisations to their country of origin have tended to develop in the po-
litical arena. However, these have usually ended up leading to symbolic political acts (i.e. the 
reciprocal recognition of the Diaspora and the Serbian state), but not to concrete common 
projects or state concessions to the Diaspora (for more on this, see Section 3.3.2). In the 
past, Serbian migrants have admittedly been involved in both collective and individual activi-
ties to develop the infrastructure in Serbia. These reached their highpoint during and imme-
diately following the NATO deployment in Serbia at the end of the 1990s. With the normalisa-
tion of the political situation in Serbia, however, the number of infrastructure projects drasti-
cally fell. In the following, we will look into the period of political crisis in Yugoslavia, in which 
migrants were mobilised to develop the infrastructure, and into the period after 2002, when 
activities declined.    
a) Individual activities 
Above all, individual migrants from Serbia supported their regions of origin during the war. 
For example, one professional employee of a German corporation organised a machine to 
control water quality after the bombing of chemical factories gave rise to the danger of con-
taminated water. Other individual initiatives included the transport – at the organisers’ own 
costs – of clothing and medicine to Serbia. Most people, however, made smaller donations to 
relief projects of Serbian clubs in Germany, to the relief funds set up for Serbians in Ger-
many, or they remitted money to the donation accounts of German relief organisations.   
b) Collective activities 
During the Kosovo war, the migrants were especially mobilised to donate. Among other 
things, the clubs utilised these financial resources to make humanitarian support available to 
the Serbian population. The humanitarian support primarily consisted in the transport of relief 
articles. Some clubs delivered the relief articles (medicine, clothing, blankets and other dona-
tions in kind) to central collection sites; others sought out addresses of Serbians in need (e.g. 
hospitals, children’s homes, refugee camps) and delivered the goods directly to those places. 
With the end of the conflict, there was initially no decline in the mobilisation of the migrants 
and the wave of relief from the Serbian clubs in Germany. A period of political euphoria fol-
lowed, reflected in high expectations for the Serbian state among migrant organisations and 
individual Serbian activists abroad. Activities focussed on the reconstruction of the infrastruc-
ture. For example, an association of highly qualified Serbians established a faculty for den-
tistry in a Serbian city. In addition, highly committed and well-situated migrants of Serbian 
origin in Germany, Switzerland and Austria (a few came from the USA and other countries in 
Europe) joined forces and founded the “Council of the Diaspora” immediately following the 
end of the Kosovo conflict. In the framework of this body, funds were established, and within 
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a very short time, DM 13 million were donated. The money generated from the funds was 
used to build bridges that had been bombed in Serbia, as well as two children’s hospitals. In 
some German cities, Serbian cultural clubs joined forces to carry out aid projects in Serbia. 
During the Kosovo war, for example, a co-ordinating group of the Serbian associations was 
established in Munich, which worked together with German relief organisations. Within the 
framework of two projects, this co-ordination group collected money intended for establishing 
a school and purchasing medical equipment for a children’s clinic in Belgrade. The Serbian 
orthodox church in Germany also supported various initiatives, primarily aimed at procuring 
godparents for orphans.  
c) The decline in activities after the end of the conflict  
With the relative normalisation of the political situation in Serbia, there was also a decline 
in the Serbian migrants’ involvement in developing the infrastructure. For one, this was be-
cause Serbian clubs and migrant alliances were no longer able to collect large donations. 
With the end of the conflict, the willingness of the Serbians living in Germany to donate de-
creased rapidly. For another, the highly qualified Serbians who were especially active did not 
manage to achieve their political aspirations for Serbia, and as a result they lost interest in 
participating in the public sector. For example, when Prime Minister Zizic assumed office, the 
Council of Diaspora mentioned above lost political influence because the new government 
thought many of the Serbian activists abroad were supporters of the Milosevic regime. Be-
yond that, in wake of the privatisation of the Serbian national affiliation, the relief funds ac-
count – together with the money invested – was lost. The Council discontinued all infrastruc-
ture projects in Serbia. Its activists are now involved in trying to locate the lost money of the 
fund.  
Many democratically oriented, politically committed Serbians from abroad who saw them-
selves as part of the Milosevic opposition felt “betrayed” by the new Serbian government; for 
they neither acquired political influence nor the chance for real political participation. Some 
Serbian clubs that had organised relief projects for Serbia during the crisis period now say 
that they are hardly active because the Serbian government has shown no interest. This may 
also be due to the fact that governmental agencies have not approached them, and they thus 
cannot judge where and in which form aid is needed. In addition, today they are dependent 
on the financial support of institutional investors because it is very difficult to mobilise Serbian 
migrants in Germany “in peaceful times”. 
3.2.4. Case Comparison 
In the case of Egypt, individual projects to develop the infrastructure are predominant. 
These have mainly aimed at education, science and healthcare. Egyptian migrants are very 
involved in infrastructure development. This involvement ranges from sporadic individual 
mediation activity, aimed at the exchange of scientists and knowledge, to long-term invest-
ments in educational, scientific and healthcare facilities. Those involved from Egypt are 
mostly migrants from the upper-middle class who came to Germany as student migrants and 
have pursued relatively successful careers in Germany. As a consequence, the migrants 
taking part in infrastructure development are educated and well-integrated. These profes-
sionals from privileged Egyptian families are primarily motivated by the desire to make a 
profit and to receive recognition for the social status that they have achieved in the course of 
their migration. In a certain sense, their involvement in Egypt allows them to duplicate and 
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strengthen their economic and social success by acquiring standing and influence among the 
professional, political and business elite in Egypt.      
  Among Egyptians, collective projects play a much smaller role. In particular, a com-
parison to to the Afghans’ projects can highlight this. While the social status and the profes-
sional qualifications of the Afghan migrants are structurally similar, they are involved in much 
more diverse infrastructure projects, and their involvement is largely collective in character.  
By contrast, the Egyptian migrants hardly act collectively to contribute the solution of infra-
structural problems in Egypt. The reciprocal relationships that arose in the migration process 
primarily serve informally to back individual initiatives (in particular, the further mediation of 
important contacts in Egypt, financial partnerships in promising projects, the promotion of 
projects in Germany and, in rare cases, the collection of donations).  
In contrast to the situation in Egypt, in Afghanistan very diverse clubs and associations 
are involved in the development of the infrastructure. This involvement is very comprehen-
sive and intense. On the balance, projects are collective. Most projects are not profit ori-
ented, but aim at the public good, as that term is commonly understood. By supplying the 
systematic infrastructure for healthcare, education, childcare and other functions, the mi-
grants’ projects in Afghanistan aim to compensate for the severe inefficiency problems of the 
state. Here, similarly to in Egypt, the well-situated Afghans in the Diaspora are among the 
main activists. However, Afghan activists with a lower social status in Germany also take part 
in infrastructure projects. The successful mobilisation of the Afghans living abroad for the 
developmental needs of their country of origin is one of the most important conditions for the 
scope and intensity of the migrants’ involvement. The interest of the world community, of 
different international organisations and, for example, of developmental aid organisations has 
especially risen since the 11th of September and the resulting NATO deployment in Afghani-
stan; at the same time, so has the interest of migrant organisations in the economic, political 
and social situation in their homeland. It is not just the traditional Afghan clubs in Germany 
that have turned their attention to Afghanistan. Many migrant organisations were established 
only after Afghanistan became increasingly important in international politics. The national 
consciousness of the Afghans, along with their feeling of belonging and of being responsible 
for Afghanistan, also increased. This can be seen, in particular, among second generation 
Afghans in Germany. In a political context in which German foreign policy and developmental 
policy, as well as international policy, focus a great deal of attention on Afghanistan, Afghan 
organisations – with their focus on their country of origin – enjoy great legitimacy and are 
thus able to fall back on various resources (money from different donators such as the de-
velopmental aid organisations, international organisations and governments, donations from 
migrants, the individual commitments of Afghan professionals or Germans). The degree to 
which the various activities in their country of origin will also continue after the political nor-
malisation in Afghanistan remains to be seen.   
The involvement of Serbian migrants in infrastructural development was induced by the 
Serbian political conflict. Here, the main motivation was the reawakening of Serbian national-
ism in the 1990s. The involvement was thus aimed at easing the crisis situation in Serbia. 
The involved migration organisations and individual migrants hoped to be able to play a po-
litical role in the newly founded nation-state. However, this hope was disappointed. When 
Serbia in fact became politically independent, Serbian activists abroad lost political influence, 
and the potential for mobilising the broad migrant population sank. Financial and political 
resources were withdrawn from the Serbian clubs and individual activists, which led to a ces-
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sation of their activities in Serbia. Many clubs are now on the verge of closing. While hardly 
any activities currently take place in the clubs, the club activists continue their contact with 
one another at a grass-roots level (they know and meet with each other). In the opinion of 
our interview partners, these connections could once again be mobilised for projects in Ser-
bia. The clubs expect impulses for mobilisation (such as financial support for particular pro-
jects, but also suggestions of important infrastructural sectors in which support is necessary), 
either from the Serbian state or from other institutional donors (such as developmental co-
operation organisations). Our interview partners view activities reliant upon money from their 
own ranks as having little chance of success. 
A comparison of the cases clearly shows that activities of migrants that are aimed at in-
frastructure development are strongly dependent on the political situation in the respective 
country of origin. Political instability in the countries of origin, including military conflicts, ap-
pears to offer a reason for mobilising the Diaspora to address the infrastructure problems 
there. This could be observed among the Afghan and Serbian migrants. By contrast, mi-
grants from politically stable states are involved in relatively few projects aimed at developing 
the infrastructure. In politically stable states such as Egypt, it is primarily wealthy migrants 
who are involved in infrastructure projects. In the course of the migration, they have experi-
enced social advancement. Infrastructure programs in their country of origin offer them the 
possibility to gain symbolic recognition for their privileged status there as well. Here it is sig-
nificant whether goods such as education and training, science, healthcare, transportation 
routes and energy and water supply are primarily provided through the state or also through 
the market. If such goods are primarily provided by the state, then the involvement of mi-
grants in infrastructure development is contextualised by national and international politics in 
the way described, and it occurs in more or less close association with the poli-
tics/government of the country of origin (Serbians, Afghans). It aims at infrastructure sectors 
that are underdeveloped because of various types of state failure. By contrast, if the goods 
mentioned are also provided through the market, then possibilities are opened for migrants to 
invest in the infrastructure of their country of origin and, by so doing, to make profits.    
The table below provides an overview of two factors influencing orientations of migrants’ 
activities in our case studies: the mode of infrastructure provision and the political situation in 
the country of origin. 
 In accord with this typology, in the studies presented here, we have been able to identify 
three forms of migrant involvement. For one, Egypt provides an example of migrant involve-
ment oriented on self-interest, as well as the desire to gain honour and self-esteem. Afghani-
stan and Serbia can primarily be classified as reflecting involvement for patriotic reasons. In 
the following, we will lay out a more detailed interpretation of two dominant types of infra-
structure development activity among the Egyptian, Afghan and Serbian migrants. The third 
type, “involvement for reasons of power and identity, morality, honour and social esteem”, 
which could be seen to motivate activities of some Egyptian migrants, is not studied here, 
because it lies on the fringes of our study, However, it would be desirable for a further study, 
building on the typology proposed here, to systematically compare these three types of ac-




Mode of infrastructure provi-
sion 
Political situation in the country of origin 
 Political conflicts/instability Political stability 
Market  Self-interested involvement: 
Economic investments in the 
infrastructure by individual afflu-
ent migrants (Egyptians). 
State  Involvement for patriotic rea-
sons:  
a) Temporary compensation 
where there is a partial lapse of 
state provision.  Here, infrastruc-
ture goods such as water, trans-
portation routes, education, 
healthcare and relief  are pro-
vided (Serbia);  
b)  Long-term compensation for   
the complete lapse of state pro-
vision. Provision of education, 
further education, healthcare, 
science, energy and  water sup-
ply and humanitarian aid (Af-
ghanistan). 
Involvement for reasons of 
power, identity, morality, hon-
our and social esteem:  
Projects, where required, in in-
frastructure sectors with insuffi-
cient  facilities (healthcare, social 
welfare) or in prestigious sectors 
(education, culture, science) 
(Egyptians, but in small num-
bers). 
a) Self-interested Involvement:  
The involvement of migrants from Egypt is paradigmatic for involvement in a politically 
stable state possessing a market mechanism for infrastructural provision. Given that in-
volvement is mostly from individuals, Egyptian migrants in Germany are relatively weakly 
mobilised. The possibility of offering the facilities for healthcare, education and science on 
the market attracts migrants with solid financial resources and professional expertise. In de-
veloping infrastructural facilities (universities, schools, clinics, research facilities), they pri-
marily aim at profit. For investments in these areas, highly qualified migrants have a consid-
erable advantage over domestic professionals who lack the inter-cultural experience and 
contacts and over (other) foreign investors. 
The German University in Cairo, which was sponsored by a German university and six 
further German institutes for the advancement of the sciences, is one example of an institu-
tion whose founding was facilitated by the successful use of political and professional con-
tacts in Germany. Some of our experts and interview partners who are familiar with the his-
tory of this institution were of the view that this success is only to be explained in reference to 
the founder’s successful use of these contacts and “skilled PR strategy”. The contact with 
German institutions is not the only advantage that highly qualified investors from the Dias-
pora have over those who have remained in the country of origin. The contacts within the 
Diaspora are a further resource. In Germany, Egyptian clubs function, as described, like the 
Rotary Clubs  and serve the reproduction of the professional Egyptian elite. The contacts 
formed and cultivated in the associations are not only spread throughout Germany. They 
also allow important relationships to be established in Egypt. 
Through their investments in the infrastructure, highly qualified Egyptian migrants do not 
just have an advantage over domestic professionals. Infrastructure provision is also a niche 
that is less interesting for foreign investors, since such a niche requires long-term ties and is 
thus risky. In addition, it requires a lot of local knowledge and social contacts. Many of those 
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we interviewed have therefore participated in the development and management of the com-
pany activities. This has required their long-term presence in Egypt. In fact, the founding of 
an undertaking in these areas usually involves some form of a return to the country. While 
this often is a disincentive for foreign investors, for many Egyptian migrants, it is an attractive 
reason for doing business there. 
   In summary, politically stable contexts in which the infrastructure sector is open to mar-
ket investments appear to make this type of involvement attractive to affluent migrants. Their 
involvement is typically through individual, long-term, profit-oriented investments. Invest-
ments in the infrastructure sector are also probable because highly qualified migrants have 
considerable comparative advantages in that sector. 
b) Involvement for patriotic reasons:  
In contrast to self-interested involvement, such as was registered (albeit not as the exclu-
sive form) among Egyptians, the Afghans and Serbians tend to be involved for patriotic rea-
sons. This similarity among the Afghans and the Serbians is due to the fact that the migrant 
activities in both countries that aimed at developing the infrastructure were induced by the 
political conflicts in their countries of origin and the loss of the state-supplied infrastructure. 
This was temporary and partial in the case of Serbia, and complete in the case of Afghani-
stan. In each case, these conflicts and their consequences resulted in a wave of mobilisation 
among the expatriates in receiving countries. In both cases, new migrant alliances arose, 
both with a focus on developing the lacking infrastructure and on easing the negative social 
consequences of the political conflicts in the countries of origin. Even those migrant organi-
sations that were otherwise mostly concerned with representing the migrants’ interests in the 
receiving country, or that supported the religious and cultural development of the migrants, 
became involved in the development of infrastructure projects in the respective countries of 
origin. These types of projects gained a great deal of recognition among the migrants living in 
Germany, and the migrants were able to be successfully mobilised for them, in particular, to 
financially back them. However, the involvement of the Serbian migrants once again de-
creased soon after the end of the military conflict in Kosovo. By contrast, the involvement of 
the Afghan migrants, which has experienced various conjunctures since the end of the 
1970s, has not abated; and in the context of the political renewal in Afghanistan since the 
deposal of the Taliban, it has even increased. 
 The question arises as to why the involvement of the Serbian migrants was so short-
lived, while the comparatively high level of involvement of the Afghans living in Germany in 
their country of origin continues.  
One of the reasons for the diminishment in the involvement of the Serbian migrants lay in 
the Serbian activists’ disappointment in the new Serbian state. The migrants were quite in-
volved in various areas, especially during the breaking up of Yugoslavia, the war and while 
the Serbian state was being newly formed. In certain respects, it stepped in to compensate 
for the state, which was caught up in the war. However, in the wake of the demise of Mil-
osevic and the change in the relationships of power, they ran up against political mistrust or 
ignorance. The hope, in particular among the intellectuals of the Diaspora, of being able to 
exert political influence and to participate in politics was largely disappointed, and their in-
volvement, as well as the mobilisation of the migrants through the Serbian clubs, diminished 
considerably. The ability to mobilise migrants in Germany for Serbia was subject to two con-
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siderable restrictions from the outset: For one, the financial resources of the worker migrants 
and their families were quite limited at any rate. For another, the Serbians in Germany were 
largely left in international isolation. They had to defend their involvement against public opin-
ion, which viewed the Serbians as the cause of the Balkan conflict. Correspondingly, they 
found neither political nor financial support. Thus, because of inner-Serbian developments, 
such as the isolation of the Diaspora, after the end of the Kosovo war, the potential of na-
tional rhetoric – oriented on ethnic identity, national pride and solidarity with the Serbian folk 
–  to mobilise sustained involvement was relatively quickly exhausted.  
In Afghanistan no similar depletion of energies has (yet) occurred. Many of our interview 
partners are indeed dissatisfied with political developments there; but their involvement with 
the infrastructure is not oriented towards political participation as much as the Serbians’ was. 
Rather, it is based on a more professional orientation (among medical doctors, engineers, 
teachers, scientists) which aims to redevelop functional and performance standards in the 
infrastructure in which they are themselves professionally involved. While their involvement is 
also motivated by their national identity, it is primarily guided by professional ethical norms 
and professional commitments. It is therefore less susceptible to being disappointed by poli-
tics in the newly formed state of Afghanistan. In addition, Afghan migrants in Germany have 
a long-term interest in developing and extending infrastructure projects in Afghanistan. Be-
yond that, Afghanistan and the involvement of its migrants are still held in high regard in in-
ternational politics; consequently migrant organisations that are engaged in the infrastructural 
development in Afghanistan can continue to fall back on the support of various institutional 
donors (governments, international organisations, developmental aid organisations, etc.). But 
in Afghanistan there is also reason to fear that, with a decrease of the international commu-
nity’s interest in the political situation in the country, the number of infrastructure projects 
might drastically decrease, along with the willingness to support them. Some things will de-
pend on whether the migrant organisations manage to become well-enough established in 
the field of co-operative international and developmental political work to survive such a pe-
riod of scant attention.    
In summary, the observation that political conflicts in the country of origin can lead to 
(new) identifications with it and the increased involvement of expatriates in infrastructure pro-
jects has been confirmed in numerous studies on migrant transnationalism (for example, in 
the considerable literature on the Tamil). At present, political conflicts are no longer pure do-
mestic political affairs of the states involved; they are also an object of international politics 
and the media. Instable states capture the attention of international organisations, including 
organisations oriented towards developmental policy. This contributes essentially to the po-
litical contexts in which the migrants are strongly mobilised to confront issues in their coun-
tries of origin. The productivity of this involvement – and its ability to address problems – de-
pends on the social constellations in the homeland, the migration history and the level of so-
cial integration of migrants in the receiving country, as well as the migrants’ resources and 
the international resonance with which their projects are met.   
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3.3. Political Participation of the Migrant in the Countries of Origin  
There have been some studies on the transnational political involvement of migrants.40 
On the one hand, it is maintained that political migrant assemblies ought to be viewed as 
autonomous transnational actors, which now wield strong influence over politics in their 
countries of origin (Koopmans; Statham, 2003 and Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2002). On the other 
hand, other studies focus on the “Diaspora politics” of the country of origin and maintain that 
the policy in the country of origin aims at influencing the type of political participation of expa-
triates as well as its intensity (Frykman, 2002 and Koser, 2002, also Wayland, 2004). Our 
pilot study shows that both the first and the second claim can be shown to be correct, de-
pending on which type of migrant community one studies. What is known as Diaspora politics 
exercises only a limited influence on the migrant networks, which are formed in connection 
with professional identity, social strata or common business interests. Under certain condi-
tions, these networks can operate as independent political actors within the country of origin. 
However, if the migrant networks are the result of political conflicts in the homeland, the Di-
aspora politics exercises great influence over them.  
In our pilot study the political participation of migrants in their country of origin is closely 
studied in relation to two cases – Serbia and Egypt. The Afghan case is not taken into con-
sideration regarding this issue. For one, this is because we largely only have access to sec-
ondary analyses of the political participation of the Afghans living in Germany. During the 
data collection phase, we could not locate political associations or individual political activ-
ists. For another, there is a lack of data on Afghanistan’s Diaspora policy. By contrast, we 
have a great deal of material on Egypt and Serbia, because we were able to carry out expert 
interviews in both of these countries and gather relevant documents on the Diaspora policies. 
Besides that, Egypt and Serbia serve as paradigmatic cases for the argumentation of this 
section: The Serbian migrants living in Germany are very interested in Serbia’s politics. The 
political participation of the Egyptians, by contrast, consists merely of lobbying work for their 
own elite networks, and it is little influenced by Egypt’s Diaspora policy. So, Egypt and Serbia 
serve as two contrasting examples of the types of political participation of migrants. An 
analysis of them consequently points to the factors that drive or impede the political participa-
tion of migrants in their countries of origin. This analysis shows that the way that political mi-
grants participate is connected to the way the respective migrant network develops and func-
tions. In relation to the situations in Egypt and Serbia, in what follows we will describe how 
the political activities of migrants and the Diaspora politics of the respective country of origin 
are related to one another.   
3.3.1. Egypt 
a) Political participation of the migrants  
Egyptian migrants living in Germany who spoke with us react to politics in their country of 
origin primarily with a view to opportunities. Many of them view themselves as critical of their 
regimes and as oriented towards democracy, but they lack the ability to translate their views 
into political action. Because many Egyptian migrants have become naturalised, Egyptians in 
Germany wield no mentionable influence on the elections. Egyptian organisations in Ger-
many that we got to know also assume a politically opportunistic posture towards the present 
                                                
40 Eva Estergaard-Nielsen (2003) provides an overview of the current stand of research on political migrant transnationalism. 
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constellations of political power. Highly qualified migrants tend to focus on developing politi-
cal contacts rather than on confrontations with power. So, too, Egyptian religious associa-
tions in Germany officially declare themselves to be apolitical. Thus the Coptic church in 
Germany distances itself from questions of Egyptian politics. It is thought better to keep 
peace with the government than to be confrontational: “for if Copts abroad stirred things up 
too much, then things would get worse, not better, for the brothers and sisters in Egypt.”41 
This political opportunism of the highly qualified Egyptian migrants, especially of the Copt 
minority, is not a matter of course. In the USA and the United Kingdom, Egyptian organisa-
tions with clear political goals for their country of origin have been organised. In the USA, for 
example, a Coptic organisation is active, which primarily works to combat the discrimination 
against Copts, but which also demands human rights and democratisation in Egypt 
(Brainard, 2003). In particular, Copts from North America seem to be politically active; and 
the Egyptian government has taken note of this. Many of our interview partners pointed out 
that one of the most important people in the ministry which Egyptians have set up specifically 
to deal with expatriates has traditionally been a Copt. Our interview partners concluded from 
this that he or she was provided with such an important position “so that Copts abroad, es-
pecially in the USA, would cause fewer problems”, in other words, to guarantee secure delib-
erations with the Copt minority abroad. 
A possible explanation for the fact that Egyptians living in Germany show more political 
opportunism than those living in America is the different migration structures dominant in 
these two countries. While it was primarily highly qualified Egyptians who came to Germany, 
the immigration to the USA and Canada, in particular by the Copts, was more politically 
charged. The Egyptians in America have thus tended more often to form organisations in 
accord with political objectives.   
Despite their opportunistic mindset, Egyptian migrants in Germany are not politically pas-
sive. Their political participation turns out to be in the form of lobbying. Some highly qualified 
migrants pursuing pragmatic political goals in Egypt have aligned themselves with the busi-
nessmen of Egyptian origin who are active in Germany and Egypt. The association of Egyp-
tian businessmen has established contact to politics in order to be able to achieve the inter-
ests of these highly qualified migrants. By taking care of some of the work of important offi-
cials in Egypt or providing them with information and expertise on certain matters of perti-
nence to their districts, they have been won over. Experts from abroad have been obtained 
to spur on certain solutions to problems, and they even provide officials help in preparing 
their speeches for their visits to Germany. In return, the officials offer their support. This pri-
marily consists in “PR for the association” within the government and in the public sphere, 
which often bears fruit. One exemplary case is the initiative of some Egyptian natural scien-
tists who were active in Germany and needed financial assistance to establish an institute for 
solar energy in Egypt. The association of Egyptian businessmen helped in the preparations 
for the opening of the German University in Cairo. It negotiated an agreement with the Egyp-
tian minister president at the time to address a public letter to the German chancellor, who 
was expected in Cairo, primarily concerned with German assistance to Egypt. The research 
                                                
41 One certainly can find politically opposing views and action in the Muslim associations. The Islamic conservatives, such as 
the Muslim Brotherhood, constitute an important political counterbalance to the residing government in Egypt. It can be pre-
sumed that the organisations associated with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, such as the IGD, support the political opposi-
tion in Egypt in one way or another. However, this support is informal. We were not able to find Muslim organisations in Ger-
many whose official reason for existence was to organise and support the political resistance in Egypt.   
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into solar energy was cited as the main focus of assistance. The German chancellor there-
upon pledged to make €10 million available for this purpose.    
  The lobbying activity of highly qualified Egyptians from the Diaspora differs from typi-
cal lobbying because it is established solely through informal channels and contact with par-
ticular individuals (and not with political parties as occurs in Germany). However, the infor-
mality and the strong personalisation of the political contacts harbours a problem. The politi-
cal influence built upon mutual favours is lost when there are changes among governmental 
leaders. For this reason, for example, only part of the €10 million that the chancellor pledged 
to the institute founders for research purposes was received. If old contacts break down, new 
ones must be painstakingly re-established. This kind of lobbying requires enormous social 
resources and is thus dependent on the personal involvement and influence of individuals 
from the Diaspora. It is less effective because, in politics, long-term trusting relationships of 
this kind are difficult to establish. 
b) Egypt’s Diaspora politics  
The Egyptian government was early to recognise the benefits of the immigration of Egyp-
tian labourers. For one, immigration eased structural problems in the Egyptian labour market. 
For another, the regular remittances of labourers living abroad were an important source of 
currency influx (Zohry, 2003). In 1981 the Federal Ministry for Migration Issues was estab-
lished. It mainly attended to the temporary migrants to other Arab states. A further objective 
was to strengthen the relationships to economically successful Egyptians in Europe and 
North America (cp. Sawi, 2005). The ministry mainly focussed on promoting the interests of 
the wealthy and highly qualified migrants in Egyptian business and involving these migrants 
in economic activities. The ministry was much less interested in the political participation of 
the migrants (cp. Fargues, 2005). In 1996 the Ministry for Migration Issues was dismantled. 
The responsibility for migration issues was transferred to the Ministry of Labour. In this way a 
new administrative body thus arose: The Ministry of Manpower and Immigration, whose im-
migration department is responsible for the contact to the Diaspora.  
  None of our active interview partners in Egypt had contact with the Migration Ministry 
or later to the immigration department.  Many indicated that the activity of the ministry was 
not important for them. In fact, little of the ministry’s activity addresses Egyptians living Ger-
many. The person in charge was insufficiently informed about the Egyptian population in 
Germany. The ministry  boasted two projects at the time of the interview. Both were initiated 
and financed by the Italian government and the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM). They were accordingly directed at the Egyptians in Italy. One result of these projects 
was the Diaspora Internet site of the Ministry, addressing all Egyptians living abroad. How-
ever, our interview partner was unaware of the existence of the Internet site. In the Ministry 
of Interior Affairs, the Ministry of  Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Insur-
ance, there are also bodies concerned with Diaspora Egyptians. However, no Diaspora pro-
jects of any substance appear to have been initiated by these bodies.    
In Egyptian political history, the 1990s are known for the liberalisation of the economic 
sector. A liberalisation measure from 1997 was related, among other things, to the adoption 
of an investment law. On the basis of this law, a new ministry (the General Authority for In-
vestment and Free Zones, [GAFl) was established. The task of this ministry consisted above 
all in the active acquisition of foreign investment. Among others, Egyptians abroad were tar-
geted for the activities of this ministry. Thus, here, too, a Diaspora sector was established in 
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the ministry, but so far it has concentrated on affluent migrants in the USA. This is probably 
related to personal contacts of certain ministry officials to migrants in the USA. Beyond that, 
according to statements of the team responsible for the Diaspora, American Egyptians are 
extremely well-organised and thus easy to identify. In the New York area, the ministry carried 
out surveys with the Egyptian Diaspora and organised an informative meeting on business 
interests for some of the most important Egyptians. However, the GAFI has not yet worked 
with European Egyptians. The ministry also has access to little information about Egyptian 
migrants in Europe, and in particular in Germany. Egyptian businessmen from Germany who 
aspire to gain political influence in Egypt through lobbying indicated that they ran into prob-
lems when taking up contact with the ministry. In the framework of the research interviews, 
however, no particular data is noted on this.   
The National Union of Egyptians Abroad is a further organisation that strives to act on the 
part of Egyptians abroad. While it is officially registered as a NGO, in fact, it is under the care 
of the Egyptian president. Until recently its main work consisted in organising an annual con-
gress of Egyptians abroad. However, in the past two years, this congress has not taken 
place. This was said to be due to the suspicion of political disloyalty among the Diaspora, 
which led to the withdrawal of the Egyptian president’s support.   
It is clear that none of the attempts of the Egyptian government related to Diaspora poli-
tics has thus far reached the Egyptians in Germany. The Diaspora’s strategies of informal 
lobbying have been effective. These even extend to contacts at the Egyptian embassy in 
Germany. Besides serving its underlying function of offering citizens registration, protection 
and national representation, it is also a relevant contact address for the Egyptian Diaspora. It 
cultivates contacts to Egyptian organisations and enterprises in Germany. The embassy in-
forms involved Egyptians about which infrastructure projects in Egypt are worth supporting. 
Ambassadors are often invited to association meetings or asked to give speeches there. 
Personal friendships are cultivated between the Egyptian migrants in Germany and the am-
bassadors. However, the access to the embassy is limited to the elite among the Egyptian 
migrants in Germany. 
3.3.2. Serbia 
The political activities of the Serbians living in Germany that are directed towards Serbia 
can hardly be separated from the Diaspora policies of Yugoslavia and later of Serbia, either 
historically or presently. Already in the 1970s, Yugoslavian guest workers organised under 
the initiation of the Yugoslavian consulates and stood in close contact with one another. At 
the beginning of the 1990s, Yugoslavian guest worker associations separated into their eth-
nic constituents. However, new migrant organisations also came into existence. Both Serbian 
clubs and other migrant organisations were politically active in the 1990s. Almost all Serbian 
organisations in Germany took a stand on the political situation in Serbia. This interest in the 
political occurrences in their country of origin has still not diminished. In principle, all of our 
interview partners were informed about the politics in Serbia and showed at least a “passive” 
interest in political participation (as voters). However, only a few of those we interviewed 
were among the political activists “from the Diaspora”. The few activists among them were 
members, or founders, of migrant organisations that pursued political objectives. Today they 
are also trying to have an impact on Serbia’s politics. They are especially interested in ques-
tions concerning the relationship between expatriates and the Serbian state.  
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 Serbia’s Diaspora policy knew to exploit the migrants’ interest in politics. In the 1990s 
the Yugoslavian consulates collaborated to reawaken the national myth in the Diaspora. 
While the relationship of the Serbian state to the migrant organisations in Germany was sev-
ered after the fall of the Milosevic government, it was renewed again in 2004. With the new 
Ministry for Diaspora, a renewed attempt is being made to gain the favour of Serbian activists 
in Germany (and other countries). And this attempt has not remained without consequences.     
a) Political Activities of Serbians in Germany and the Serbian Diaspora policy   
The phase of political mobilisation: During the 1990s Serbian life in Germany met with 
massive upheavals.  Against the background of the rediscovery of national identities and the 
democratisation in Yugoslavia, these organisations focussed on “the national question” and 
the future of the political system in Serbia. While nearly all of them were democratically ori-
ented,  nearly all of them were also positive about the reawakening of Serbian nationalism. In 
this initial mobilisation phase, newly founded Serbian organisations were mainly concerned 
with cultivating their own ethnic roots. They established new church communities and organ-
ised folklore festivities and concerts with folk singers from Serbia. These sorts of activities 
helped them gain the favour of many Serbians living in Germany. The number of Serbian 
migrants participating in these events was so large that it is nearly possible to speak of a 
mass mobilisation. 
  Yugoslavian consulates showed a particular interest in the new migrant organisations. 
They thus maintained a list of the active Serbian clubs in Germany and regularly attended 
club meetings. Embassy and consulate officials were befriended with some of the club activ-
ists. In addition, the consulates attempted to support the club activities. For example, they 
assisted in arranging folk singers or folk groups for the club events. Beyond the activities 
related to cultivating their own ethnic identity, in particular, highly qualified Serbians in Ger-
many, but also throughout Europe, met within the framework of “discussion forums”. There it 
was possible to engage in exchanges on political ideas or, for example, the role of Serbian 
expatriates in the process of political renewal.  
The rediscovery of the ethnic identity of Serbian migrants and the simultaneous political 
mobilisation of them for their country of origin served as fruitful ground for the Yugoslavian 
Diaspora politics. As one of our interview partners expressed it: “Milosevic knew very well to 
exploit the Diaspora.” For one, at the beginning of the 1990s, the Milosevic government an-
nounced a program able to be characterised as “loans for the fatherland”. The program solic-
ited for state investment funds with attractive interest rates, which migrants were to invest in. 
Serbians abroad invested in these funds. With this money, the Milosevic government subsi-
dised the ailing large scale industry. For another, as he later boasted, the money also was 
spent for military activities in Croatia and Kosovo (Hockenos, 2003). Neither the first nor the 
second “investment strategy” was profitable. The migrants’ money was thus lost in a collaps-
ing system.   
Through monetary investments, the Diaspora was not just an (involuntary) financial sup-
porter of the Milosevic government. Politically active migrant organisations also functioned as 
a mouthpiece for Serbia at a time of political isolation and during the Kosovo war. When the 
situation in Yugoslavia escalated, numerous migrant organisations began to publicly fight 
“against the defamation of Serbia”. They organised demonstrations and appeals, wrote pub-
lic letters and organised discussions with German politicians. Above all, they wanted to 
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counter what they perceived to be the one-sided reporting on the political situation in Yugo-
slavia. Many also attempted to get their own views of the situation in Yugoslavia across. 
However, these public actions had comparatively little effect. The majoritarian German public 
stance was that Serbian nationalism was one of the decisive causes for the political conflict 
in Yugoslavia; and the actions of the migrant organisations were perceived as support for the 
Milosevic regime.  
The increasing gravity of the political situation in Serbia at the end of the 1990s, together 
with the symbolic recognition of the politically committed migrants on the part of the Serbian 
government, led to a de facto increase in the migrants’ political influence in Serbia. In 1999 a 
Diaspora conference was organised in Belgrade. There, representatives from American and 
European migrant organisations met. They established a Council for the Diaspora, which 
was to be responsible for the concerns of Serbians abroad and was formally affiliated with 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Soon afterwards, Milosevic was deposed. The oppositional 
politician, Zoran Zizic, became prime minister. However, the Zizic government had little inter-
est in the concerns of the Diaspora.   
The Zizic era, the period of disappointment: The Zizic government reinterpreted the politi-
cal role of the expatriate organisations. The foreign Serbians were viewed as Milosevic sup-
porters. The relationships to them were more or less severed. For example, although the 
consulates stood in close contact to the Serbian organisations before 1999, they had hardly 
any interest in co-operating with Serbian clubs when they resumed their work in Germany. 
Now Serbian clubs were viewed as groups of throwbacks, of hardly any use. The relation-
ships of the Serbian clubs to the consulates have still not recovered.  
The political expectations of the involved Serbians from Germany were not fulfilled. The 
Council for the Diaspora was hardly able to accomplish anything in the Zizic era. The Zizic 
government also showed little interest in appointing other political representatives of the Di-
aspora. This especially disappointed the migrants who had been in the opposition and had 
tended to support Zizic. In addition, they were upset by the results of the long sought democ-
ratisation. According to our interview partners, the political system established in Serbia was 
beset with nepotism. The distribution of power was organised such that individual parties 
directly took over certain governmental departments. Nearly all of the administrative posts 
were assigned to someone on the basis of loyalty to “the party dominant in the respective 
ministry”. In this type of a system, political contacts and party membership were what 
counted. In isolated cases, migrants who were close to certain parties or who had relation-
ships with high-ranking people were able to tap these relationships for their own purposes. 
However, most Serbians living Germany found it difficult to gain access to these political 
networks. This can be seen, in particular, in the relationship of the Serbian parties to their 
party members in Germany. 
A network of politically active Serbians who were supportive of a particular Serbian party 
arose in Germany as early as the 1990s. Activists in these networks were often party mem-
bers in Serbia. They supported campaigns for local, regional or national elections and oper-
ated in Germany for their parties. However, the experience of one party group in Germany 
shows that the contact of the migrants to their comrades in Serbia was one-sided. The gov-
ernment showed the Diaspora party very little recognition. This is evidenced by the fact that 
the migrant groups were in no way integrated into the organisational structure of the party, 
and their members had little chance for a political career in the party. The reason for this was 
that party functionaries did not permit any competition from abroad. As a result, none of the 
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party members from the Diaspora were elected to the Serbian Parliament. The party did use 
the political commitment of the migrants, but it did not allow them access to the domestic 
political networks and thus to political influence in Serbia. 
The rebirth of the Serbian Diaspora politics after 2004: With the new shift of power in 
Serbia in 2004, the government rediscovered the political and economic power of the Dias-
pora. For one, migrants were able to take part in the election in 2004. For another, with 
Prime Minister Kustunica’s entry into power, a ministry was created to support the concerns 
of Serbians abroad. However, this new attempt of the Serbian government to mobilise Serbi-
ans living abroad for their country of origin is considered by many of the involved Serbians to 
have failed. They do not view the way the Serbian consulates prepared for voting or the ac-
tivity of the Ministry for Diaspora as effective.  
  The percentage of migrants who voted in the first parliamentary election was incredi-
bly low. According to the data of our interview partners who are among the Serbian political 
insiders,  approximately 1,000 Serbians voted. Worldwide, outside of Serbia about 10,000 
Serbians voted. However, this low participation rate in the election is not a sign of disinterest 
among the Diaspora Serbians. Rather, the Serbian administration was responsible for these 
desolate numbers. In particular, the consulates’ lack of the ability to organise the elections 
was significant. Migrants were not informed of the possibility of voting. Absentee mail voting 
was not allowed, and it was necessary to appear at the consulate beforehand in order to reg-
ister. Only after that was it possible to take part in the election. In sum, it was expected that 
the migrants independently inform themselves of the possibility of voting; after doing so, it 
was expected that they appear at the consulate at least two times (once to register and once 
to vote). Since there are few Serbian consulates in Germany, it can be assumed that only 
strong-headed political activists cast their votes.  
With its programs, the Ministry for Diaspora that was established in 2005 is supposed to 
promote Diaspora programs in Serbia. However, at the time of this writing, the ministry has 
few concrete achievements. Thus, for example, the compulsory military service for second 
generation migrants is among the regularly discussed, yet still unresolved problems that 
complicates the relationships of the migrants to Serbia. The council has in fact striven to free 
second generation migrants from compulsory military service. The new Ministry for Diaspora 
has also promised to make improvements on this matter. Yet nothing has yet been done. A 
further controversial topic is related to the financing of language courses. With the dissolution 
of Yugoslavia, courses for Serbians in their mother tongue were stopped. Now Serbian mi-
grant activists are attempting to have them resumed. The ministry has declared that it would 
tend to the issue, but again there have been no visible results.  
 What are the reasons for the ineffectiveness of the new Serbian Diaspora politics? They 
lie in the structural particularities of the Serbian political system. As already mentioned, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry for Diaspora are responsible for the contacts to 
the Diaspora. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs does little in this regard. According to state-
ments from our interview partners, this is due to the personnel’s lack of expertise. The impor-
tant posts in the consulates are usually appointed to civil servants from the political parties. 
The main reason for the appointments is apparent loyalty to the party and not necessarily 
professionalism. The Ministry for Diaspora is dominated by a small party that has little influ-
ence on present Serbian politics. The ministry thus has little leeway, and its politics is limited 
to symbolic gestures.   
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b) Effect of the symbolic politics of the Ministry for Diaspora   
One focus of the Ministry for Diaspora are the Serbian migrants who have achieved pro-
fessional success in the receiving countries and amassed financial resources. For these 
“elite among the Serbian Diaspora”, the ministry, together with the Serbian Chamber of 
Commerce (SIHK), organises an annual Diaspora congress in Belgrade. Reciprocal recogni-
tion is usually the centrepiece here. Accordingly, “important Diaspora members” are distin-
guished for their commitment to Serbia. Beyond that, at regular intervals, the Ministry for Di-
aspora has begun to announce new plans, the Serbian Chamber of Commerce (SIHK) pro-
vides information about investment possibilities in Serbia. Because of all this, the Diaspora 
once again is beginning to feel accepted by the political community and is hoping for support 
from the Serbian government.    
A further activity of the Ministry for Diaspora consists in visits from officials of different 
governmental departments, together with representatives of the SIHK, to representatives of 
Serbian organisations in different states of Europe, North America and Australia. As a rule, 
during such visits, personal contacts are cultivated. Some relationships have proven to be 
especially beneficial for the later economic activities of migrants in Serbia. However, neither 
long-term infrastructure projects nor political decisions favourable for the Serbian Diaspora 
have resulted from such meetings.     
A summary of the activities of the Ministry for Diaspora shows that it is mainly concerned 
with symbolic politics. It does no more than rhetorically recognise the Diaspora and facilitate 
the cultivation of social contacts. However, new informal contacts between Serbian busi-
nessmen from abroad, Serbian politicians and active Serbian migrants are a side-effect of 
this policy. Besides that, with the encouragement of the Ministry for Diaspora, Serbian mi-
grants have once again begun to organise themselves in different kinds of associations. In 
2006, the “Serbian Diaspora”, a new assembly for the associations, was founded in Munich. 
The goal of the assembly is to strengthen the relationships of Serbians to their country of 
origin, to promote business and cultural relationships between Serbia and Germany and to 
organise infrastructure projects. In addition, in the north of Germany, a league of the Serbian 
Diaspora was also established with the aim of bringing together Serbians from eight northern 
German cities. At the European level, a Diaspora organisation has also been founded, which 
boasts of representing the Serbian Diaspora from many states at the EU. It is still too early to 
evaluate the potential and the effectiveness of these and other new organisations. However, 
it is clear that, with scant resources, the Serbian Diaspora politics has managed to enlist nu-
merous Serbians abroad to politically support the country. 
3.3.3. Case Comparison 
The models of political participation among the Serbian and the Egyptian migrants differ 
intensely. Correspondingly, the possibilities of the country of origin having an effect on the 
migrant networks in Germany differ. The political participation of the Egyptian migrants is 
limited to the informal lobbying by Egyptian businessmen and highly qualified professionals 
abroad. To some extent, in Germany these migrants form an independent elite network. 
Through contacts to the Egyptian embassy and to important people in Egyptian politics, this 
elite network attempts to gain political influence. Here, the network pursues pragmatic politi-
cal objectives (for example, the acquisition of money for their own projects, influence over 
political decisions, etc.). The programs of various organisations of the Egyptian government 
that conduct official Diaspora politics do not reach this network at all. The political organisa-
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tions responsible for migrants tend to be reactive. They wait until the Diaspora take up con-
tact, something which often occurs informally, through acquaintances. If this contact is not 
established, the official Diaspora programs are hardly able to generate their intended effects.    
 The political involvement of the migrant organisations of Serbians living in Germany is 
multi-layered and relatively intensive. Within the course of the 1990s, it assumed various 
forms: from PR work in favour of Yugoslavia’s politics to assistance in setting up political par-
ties and establishing their own “Diaspora committees” within the political landscape of Ser-
bia. Because of the great interest in the political development of Serbia, the political meas-
ures addressing the Diaspora are very efficacious. However, the state actors responsible for 
the Diaspora only possess meagre political and financial resources, and they are therefore in 
no position to actively promote the interests of Serbians abroad in their country of origin. This 
is one important reason that they are virtually only engaged in symbolic politics, limited to 
cultivating contacts with important Serbians and Serbian organisations abroad and gestures 
of mutual recognition. What is amazing, however, is that the symbolic politics of the Serbian 
state appear to have had noteworthy effects. They contribute to the establishment of political 
relationships, with important repercussions for the economic activities of the Diaspora in Ser-
bia. Beyond that, however, through the symbolic politics of the country of origin, new alli-
ances of migrants have been established in the receiving countries; these migrants in fact 
feel obligated to support their homeland. How can the different patterns of the political par-
ticipation of migrants in Serbia and Egypt be explained? In our opinion, the modes by which 
the respective migrant networks develop and function must be taken into account. Highly 
organised Egyptian networks in Germany are networks of the elite group of migrants into the 
education system, which, like Rotary Clubs, contribute to reproducing, stabilising and 
strengthening their own social position both in the receiving country and in their country of 
origin. Given this, it is not surprising that their political participation assumes the form of lob-
bying for their own interests. Serbian migrants were organised against the background of the 
Serbian political conflicts. Their networking and activities were stimulated by the newly in-
flamed Serbian nationalism at the beginning of the 1990s. One of the main objectives of their 
activities was therefore to promote Serbia’s future development. This unfolded in the forms of 
individual and collective political participation typical for modern nation-states.  
  Further, the modes by which the respective migrant networks develop and function 
explain how susceptible to influence they are. Egyptian elite networks operate largely 
autonomously of the actors of Egyptian Diaspora politics. By contrast, however, Serbian mi-
grant networks are very hopeful about the prospects for Serbia. Despite several disappoint-
ing experiences, political input from their country of origin has not lost importance. The fact 
that the ethnic-national identity of these migrants is one of the few legitimising bases for their 
self-organisation in Germany appears to be responsible for this. Political signals addressed 
to them from their country of origin thus assume considerable importance.  
 These considerations, based on the exemplary study of two cases, offer a starting 
point for further reflections on the effectiveness of the political efforts of migrants’ countries of 
origin to involve their Diaspora in the domestic political life or to influence the activities of the 
Diaspora thataffect development. According to the results of our study, the effectiveness of 
these efforts appears to be largely dependent on whether they are able to decipher the 
modes by which the networks of migrants develop and function. This task is made more diffi-
cult by the fact that the migrant networks can differ considerably from country to country. 
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4. Conclusions and Recommendations 
The following general conditions, which underlie the analysis of the development contri-
butions of Diaspora communities, were points of reference in the examination of our case 
studies: (a) the migrants themselves (i.e. their human capital); (b) the reasons for their migra-
tion (work, education, flight, family/marriage); (c) the social conditions in the receiving country 
and their social integration there; (d) the social conditions in their country of origin and the 
position of the migrants or their families there; and (e) the social forms of organisation of mi-
grants in their receiving country (structure of the Diaspora). 
4.1. Conclusions 
Depending on the Diaspora community, the variables of this frame of reference are com-
bined in different ways, as is evident from the communities we looked at in Germany.   
Egyptians 
The Egyptians are mainly elite upper-middle-class migrants into the education system, 
who have come to Germany since the 1950s. A higher percentage of Egyptians are univer-
sity educated specialists. A relatively high percentage are naturalised, are in German-
Egyptian marriages and are well-integrated into the receiving society. As a rule, highly quali-
fied migrants of Egyptian origin are organised in professional associations and Egyptian cul-
ture clubs. Similarly to Rotary Clubs, these also serve to reproduce, stabilise and strengthen 
their own elite networks. In comparison to the other two countries we examined, relatively 
stable political and economic conditions are dominant in Egypt, connected with numerous 
possibilities for profitable investments. A range of Egyptians take advantage of these possi-
bilities. We thus find a considerable number of profit-oriented investments, as well as indi-
vidually initiated activities that contribute to the collective good. These are above all in the 
prestigious areas of education and science. 
At the same time, the general conditions under which these productive investments and 
activities in Egypt occur considerably limit their developmental potential and prevent many 
Egyptians from abroad from becoming involved. These concern problems with the transpar-
ency of the legal system, the lack of production and quality standards, as well as the exis-
tence of clientelism. The central importance that networks play in decision-making and 
reaching agreements entails the danger that decisions and processes will loose their stand-
ing when the networks break down, for example, when political officials loose their offices. 
These networks are therefore often unreliable and insecure.   
Afghans 
The first Afghan migrants, who came to Germany in the 1950s, were mainly business-
men, especially carpet dealers, or students from various disciplines, but especially medicine 
and engineering. In the wake of the war in 1979 and the numerous political power shifts fol-
lowing it, Afghans with the necessary economic and social resources for the escape route 
came to Germany. Initially, members of the western-oriented educated elite (university pro-
fessors, teachers, students) sought asylum in Germany. After the mujahideen came to 
power, members of the communist party also came. The Taliban regime triggered another 
wave of migration, largely of members of the urban middle class as well as ethnic and reli-
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gious minorities. Given the differing motivations for the immigration from Afghanistan and the 
different social composition of the groups taking part in it, the Afghan Diaspora is very het-
erogeneous. Its members differ from one another considerably regarding religion, political 
orientation, educational background and social class membership.   
 Later waves of refugees were, and are, usually confronted with considerable difficul-
ties integrating into Germany. These are related to their legal status and labour-market re-
strictions on their activity in Germany. There is also a failure to recognise their human capital. 
Increasingly, however, the second generation Afghan immigrants are successfully integrating 
into the German education system, and, according to the results of our study, they are also 
very interested in the developments in their country of origin.    
The individual involvement in Afghanistan (e.g. with remissions and individual invest-
ments), and, more importantly, the collective involvement (through a number of associations 
and registered professional societies), began with the outbreak of the war in 1979. Over time, 
this intensified, and in wake of the political developments, it became particularly strong after 
2001. Through more than two decades of war, major segments of the physical and social 
infrastructure of the country have been destroyed. The new Afghan state is not (yet) able to 
provide the public goods necessary to normalise social life. The Diaspora thus has the role of 
compensating for the deficits of the state by getting involved in infrastructure projects in the 
areas of education, healthcare, science, girls’ and women’s advancement, humanitarian aid, 
transport, and energy and water provision. The increased involvement of the Diaspora in 
Afghanistan has undoubtedly been stimulated by the degree of international attention (espe-
cially directly after the NATO deployment in 2001). In this context, successful financial and 
political resources from national and international donators, as well as other actors such as 
NGOs, were able to be mobilised and at times linked in synergetic relationships with projects 
of the Diaspora. 
Against this background, the urgent developmental policy question is whether the migrant 
organisations and other relevant participants will manage to stabilise the current involvement 
at a level able to maintain what has been achieved. This is necessary to drive the develop-
ment necessary in the country. Yet it could be endangered should the degree of international 
political, and media, attention decrease further and, with it, the willingness to make resources 
available.    
Serbians 
The immigration of Serbians to Germany – initially as Yugoslavians – began in the 1950s 
with the guest worker agreement and continued on the basis of this program until the re-
cruitment stop in 1973. Their qualification structure included a range of unskilled and skilled 
labour. However, a large number of the less qualified workers returned to Serbia after the 
recruitment stop. Subsequent to that, the immigration of Serbians to Germany was largely 
the result of family reunifications. Besides the guest workers, since the 1950s a small yet 
steady number of Serbian intellectuals had also immigrated, mostly opponents of the com-
munist regime.  
  As a rule, Yugoslavians and, later, Serbians have organised in clubs (often sport or 
culture clubs), which have concentrated on the life of Serbian migrants in Germany. With the 
increase in ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia and the ensuing collapse of the country, the national 
consciousness of the Serbians in Germany also increased. Serbian clubs were founded in 
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the place of Yugoslavian ones, and these were mainly dedicated to cultivating the newly 
found national identity.   
Before the outset of the conflict in Yugoslavia, individual investments in Yugoslavia, in 
particular, for the acquisition of real estate, were the focus of the Diaspora’s activities there. 
(This is now also the case for Serbians.) In contrast to the Egyptians and the Afghans, the 
Yugoslavian Diaspora tended not to be much involved in infrastructure development projects 
in their country of origin. This was different during the war that led to the dissolution of the 
country and during the Kosovo conflict. Here, the Serbian Diaspora, similar to the Afghans, if 
less extensively, acted on the basis patriotic commitments: To compensate for the state, 
which was tied up in the war, it became involved in various projects, providing healthcare, 
water, transport and humanitarian relief.     
As opposed to the situation of the Afghans, the weak state was able to patriotically mobi-
lise the Serbian migrants to support it. The activities of the Afghans, by contrast, have been 
much more strongly characterised by the breakdown of the state; thus their activities are not 
even directed at the state. The Serbians in Germany, by contrast, were publicly involved in 
attempting to correct what they viewed to be the one-sided view of Serbia in the international 
press. They were all the more disappointed when, after the deposition of Milosevic and the 
end of the Kosovo conflict, the successor government depreciated this involvement and 
largely severed their political influence.  
Only very recently, with the 2005 founding of the Serbian Ministry for Diaspora, has there 
been a renewed attempt to activate the economic and political potential of the Serbian Dias-
pora. This shows that for Serbian migrants – in stark contrast to the migrants in the other two 
countries investigated – the forms of organisation, as well as the political orientation of their 
involvement in their country of origin, are strongly determined by the political developments 
in that country. The majority of Serbian migrants in Germany are labour migrants, who have 
indeed settled in Germany, but who can nevertheless be strongly mobilised to support the 
Serbian state and its politics, especially in periods of conflict. 
The cases we have studied show clearly that in order to be able to recognise where de-
velopmental policy assistance might be applied, a precise case-by-case analysis is needed. 
This should refer to the points of conjuncture of the different frameworks at various points of 
time and to their combined effect on the mobilisation of the Diaspora communities. On the 
basis of this, action can be recommended for different areas:  
A) the promotion of economic activities, 
B) the promotion of activities related to the social infrastructure, 
C) the promotion of the political participation of the Diaspora, 
D) the promotion of the existing Diaspora structures,  
E) the development of legal and political conditions in the receiving country, as well as 
F) international collaboration. 
In what follows, different ideas for these areas will be outlined. 
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4.2. Recommended Action   
A) The promotion of economic activities 
• In numerous interviews it was pointed out that the failure to maintain quality specifica-
tions and the lack of production standards in Egypt and Serbia were severe obstacles to 
the expansion of exports to Germany and the EU. An already existing assistance pro-
gram backed by the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) to promote the Serbian export 
industry aims to inform Serbian producers about EU-compatible product standards and 
to advise them of ways to achieve them. A similar program would also be interesting for 
Egypt. Here, striving for collaboration with specialists from the Diaspora to promote qual-
ity in their country of origin might be considered, e.g. in the form of public-private part-
nerships.     
• In Afghanistan, the development of the energy sector is of central importance for increas-
ing the prospects of success of ongoing and planned infrastructure and economic activi-
ties. Afghan engineers with various specialisations from the Diaspora are already active 
in this field. They mainly want to be better integrated into the German co-operative de-
velopment work and to procure professional know-how from collaboration partners. Here, 
in the future, a special emphasis could be placed on the collaboration between Diaspora 
engineers and the GTZ in the area of regenerative energy, since the natural precondi-
tions for this are optimal in Afghanistan. A practical proposal is to collect systematic and 
extensive wind data in various regions in order to test the efficiency of the use of wind-
mills.  
• A similar interest exists for the agricultural sector. In the Afghan Diaspora in Germany, 
there are numerous agricultural engineers who have already conducted studies on re-
generating the agriculture sector and who could be appointed as experts in German co-
operative development work. Because Afghanistan is an agrarian country, the agricul-
tural sector is of major importance for economic regeneration.     
• Besides that, more attention should be paid to activities in rural areas of Afghanistan (as 
opposed to cities). Many of the foreign NGOs are predominantly active in Kabul. Be-
cause of their specific knowledge of the regions they are from, Afghan Diaspora organi-
sations appear to be more apt to assume the risks of establishing projects in rural areas. 
Supporting these projects would therefore particularly benefit the development in rural 
areas. 
B) The promotion of activities related to the social infrastructure 
• It would be possible to develop models to finance fellowship programs to guarantee ac-
cess to institutions such as the German University in Cairo for all those interested, and 
not merely for those who have the necessary financial resources available. The same 
applies for the German schools in Cairo.   
• In Afghanistan, first of all, support appears to be necessary in re-establishing and devel-
oping the educational sector. The illiteracy rate in Afghanistan is among the highest in 
the world; thus education is of central importance. In this context, it is necessary to sup-
port both the construction of school buildings and the development and provision of 
course materials. However, the greatest need is for assistance in the training of teaching 
personnel. In line with the curriculum drawn up by the Afghan Ministry of Education, new 
teaching personnel must be trained or the current teachers must be newly trained. To of-
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fer qualifications on site, suitably qualified people from the Diaspora in Germany could be 
temporarily mobilised. Here, links should be established with the already existing co-
operative work with aid organisations that have participated in the Iserlohn conference 
mentioned in the text; for some time, they have already dealt with the issues related to 
teacher qualification.    
• Improving the healthcare provision in Afghanistan ought to be a further focus. Here, for 
one, clinics and emergency rooms are inadequately equipped, for example, with medical 
equipment, medicine, nursing resources (e.g. beds, wheelchairs). Those interviewed also 
clearly indicated that, in addition to that, the logistical means for transporting the medical 
equipment are often lacking. These things could serve as important starting points for 
projects aimed at improving the healthcare sector in Afghanistan. For another thing, 
however, in particular, qualified personnel is lacking. Afghan associations of medical doc-
tors in Germany, for example, make fellowships available for the further education or 
specialisation of doctors from Afghanistan, who attend courses in Germany. They also 
provide advanced training in their areas of specialisation in Afghanistan. These activities 
are sensible approaches to improving the qualifications of medical doctors in Afghani-
stan, and they could be further developed with the proper form of financial support. In 
this way, for example, the exchange of knowledge about modern medical standards at 
international congresses could be supported.     
• Here it is in generally to be noted that the promotion of the exchange and transfer of 
knowledge, in particular in healthcare, but also in other areas, would be desirable for all 
three countries. This can occur at diverse levels (for students, lecturers or professors). 
Various forms of exchanging and transferring knowledge are mentioned in our inter-
views. In general, there is a strong interest in this – and a particularly strong potential for 
it – among the Diaspora communities in Germany.   
C) The promotion of the political participation of the Diaspora 
• Our analysis shows that the Serbians have a strong political interest in their homeland. 
However, as was described in the study, due to the effort required, the majority of Serbi-
ans in Germany did not participate in the 2004 elections, despite possessing the legal 
right to vote. It is common in international collaboration (in particular within the framework 
of measures promoting democratisation) to fall back on the expertise of international or-
ganisations, which, for their part, rely on national experts (e.g. the expertise of the OSCE 
in election observation): accordingly, the bilateral support of the Serbian government in 
developing an efficient voting procedure should be considered (e.g. by means of absen-
tee mail voting). 
D) The promotion of the existing Diaspora structures 
In the findings of a recent Diaspora study  (De Haas: June 2006), among other things, the 
author identifies the following point of departure for the successful implementation of policies 
in this field: “Recognising that migrants are already mobilised for development on their own 
initiative rather than ‘mobilising diasporas’, development actors themselves should be ‘mobi-
lised’ to engage with and to learn from diasporas in development cooperation so as to estab-
lish a genuine two-way working relationship.” 
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On the basis of our findings, we can only agree. It is important to support the existing 
structures and networks and not to presume that it is necessary to externally mobilise the 
migrants. We thus suggest: 
• For the Egyptian Diaspora, which is relatively well-endowed with resources and therefore 
less in need of financial and institutional support, it is worth considering whether the 
promotion of reciprocal contacts and the flow of information between official Egyptian 
competent authorities and the Egyptian Diaspora should be emphasised; for our study 
shows that neither the potential of the Egyptians in Germany nor the means for dealing 
with their specific problems are addressed in Egyptian policy.    
• The loss associated with a “quasi-return” presents a problem. Migrants who establish 
their own businesses in Egypt, and thus decrease the amount of time they reside in 
Germany, fall out of contact with their networks (the work of the associations). However, 
precisely these successful entrepreneurs can function to multiply knowledge about the 
forms of involvement in Egypt, as well as the possibilities and the prospects of this in-
volvement. Businessmen who are now successful in Egypt, for example, can offer the 
best information about where investments might be made and which form they might 
take; or in certain cases, they can provide information about which difficulties might be 
expected. These businessmen could help establish interest and confidence in investing 
in Egypt.   
• In the Egyptian Diaspora, there are also individual actors who are interested, competent 
and committed, but who do not have access to the necessary financial resources. Here, 
too, it would be possible to provide support. 
• Strong fractions, such as those within the Afghan Diaspora, hamper effective involve-
ment relevant for development because the activities that are being engaged in are often 
not bundled where it appears sensible for them to be. Individual relief organisations often 
work independently of one another or in competition with one another. One exception is 
DAMF e.V., which includes numerous associations for medical doctors. Exchanges re-
garding the work of the individual associations and their projects are also seldom. One 
forum for such exchanges among the NGOs that are active in Afghanistan does organise 
a conference in the city of Iserlohn. However, this only takes place once per year. Here a 
co-ordination site to organise the exchanges of and links between work and ongoing pro-
jects could serve as a corrective.   
• Beyond that, an increase in the professionalisation of Diaspora projects would be desir-
able. This could be achieved, for example, by offering (country-specific) seminars on 
fund raising, which provide the needed knowledge and competences for dealing with po-
tential donors, procedures, personnel management, the recruiting of volunteers, etc.  
• Special attention should be paid to second generation immigrants. Here, in particular, 
those in the Afghan and Egyptian Diaspora have a strong interest in being involved in 
their respective homeland. They also clearly have a potential that should be taken seri-
ously. In addition, precisely the second generation Afghan migrants tend to be willing to 
shed the prejudices against other Afghan groups. Numerous of our interview partners 
emphasised this potential of the younger generation and ascribed this to their modern 
education. On the basis of their solid knowledge of the language and culture of both 
countries (Afghanistan and Germany), with the appropriate support, some of them could 
come to function as intercultural intermediaries. However, second generation Serbians 
and the increasing number of Serbian student migrants could also come to assume such 
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an intermediary role in the future. Here, summer schools could serve as catalysers by 
bringing second generation Serbians and the student migrants from Serbia into contact 
with one another and specifically making this an issue. 
• Within the framework of our study, our interview partners, in particular those from Af-
ghanistan and Serbia, expressed a strong interest in further information on the structure 
of the Diaspora, the breadth of its activities and the various activities in their country of 
origin that are based in it. There are in fact numerous newspapers, newsletters, websites 
and so forth, as well as television and radio stations in the respective languages. How-
ever, amidst the over-supply and the failing resources for distribution, there appears to 
be a need for a structured forum to communicate the available potential. In this context, 
our Serbian interview partners suggested the idea of opening an information centre, 
which would provide information on the possibilities for involvement (the possibilities for 
assistance and the focus of investments). The information on the possible involvement 
and the successful projects in existence would facilitate the organisations’ evaluation of 
their own work; such a centre could also serve as something of an exchange for best 
practices.   
E) The development of legal and political conditions in the receiving country    
In principle, the migrants who contribute the most to the development of their countries of 
origin are those who, on the basis of a permanent residence permit and the equal opportunity 
to access the labour market, have acquired a good social standing in the receiving country 
and thus are well-integrated there. Insecure residence status and an insecure social position 
in the receiving country are accompanied by lower economic and intellectual potential. As a 
consequence of years of having remained outside of the labour force, the limited access to 
certain professions and/or to further education, with time, the potential, the knowledge and 
the skills of many migrants lapse. As a result, their potential to contribute to the development 
of their country of origin and their receiving country also decreases.  
• A higher degree of integration, as well as good social standing, contribute to the activities 
of the Diaspora members. The rights and limitations connected with a given residence 
status play an important role. It follows from what has been presented here that the po-
tential of migration can only develop if all three parties are benefited: first the migrants; 
then the receiving countries due to social integration; and finally, on this basis, the coun-
try of origin because of the involvement, competence and wealth of resources of the mi-
grants. As a consequence, it is of central importance to establish secure residence 
status. In our view, the integration of migrants would thus also promote “brain circula-
tion”.   
• In this context, allowing double citizenship is important. The loss of citizenship in one’s  
country of origin as a result of naturalisation often results in greater obstacles for those 
migrants who are later involved in their countries of origin: It can entail the loss of the 
right to vote and the loss or the right to acquire real estate, as well as cumbersome visa 
requirements to later enter the country. Allowing double citizenship can thus be an ap-
propriate strategy for promoting the involvement of immigrants to Germany in their coun-
tries of origin.    
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As a consequence, a migration and integration policy with the objective of promoting the 
social integration of the migrants will at the same time promote the Diaspora migrants in their 
involvement with their countries of origin. Such a migration policy, which includes a compre-
hensive integration policy, is simultaneously a good developmental policy. It taps the re-
sources of those concerned and attempts to mobilise them for development. In this context, it 
is significant to note our impression that many migrants in the Diaspora communities (and 
their networks) possess specific and valuable knowledge that ought to be taken account of in 
designing future developmental policy strategies. Thus, it would be valuable to reflect on the 
ways in which representatives of the Diaspora communities might be more strongly inte-
grated into developmental policy bodies as advisors. 
F) International co-operation    
• Through remittances, the Diaspora members make a significant impact on their countries 
of origin. This issue is not only debated considerably within the major receiving countries, 
at the national level, but also at the international level. As many international organisa-
tions now advocate, it is important to develop transparent and cheaper systems for remit-
tances. Insofar as the remittances affect the development of the infrastructure (especially 
in rural areas), co-financing programs might play the most important role here. This 
could, for example, build on the years of experience of the tres por uno program in Mex-
ico or the EU financing programs. However, in order to establish confidence and stimu-
late investment, it is crucial that the project management be taken on by the local com-
munities and/or the Diaspora community.    
• In addition, an international (or bilateral) exchange with receiving countries that have 
larger Diaspora communities would also be sensible. For example, a comparison of the 
Serbian Diaspora living in the USA and in Germany could be productive. A focus on their 
impact on the development in Serbia could facilitate a more precise understanding of the 
relationship between the Diaspora and their countries of origin in general and of the sig-
nificance of this for development in particular.  
Beyond that, in accord with the desires of members of the Egyptian Diaspora, the poten-
tials connected with assisting the international networking of the respective Diaspora 
should be more fully integrated into bilateral or international discussions.  
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